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Abstract
Earthquakes can cause catastrophic accidents to the railroads in terms of serious facility
damages and large number of passenger fatalities and injuries. To reduce earthquake risk,
various safety counter-measures can be employed. Among them, performing an acceler-
ated construction program of track strengthening, retrofitting rail viaducts, installing
warning systems, and improving the braking systems are considered by JR East.
This thesis first modeled and estimated the collective earthquake risk which includes the
physical damages due to track or viaduct failures and passenger fatalities and injuries due
to the train derailment when running trains hit the track failures. Both the base collective
risk and the perceived collective risk are calculated by employing the concepts of Safety
Performance Index (SPI) and Perceived Safety Performance Index (PSPI). After assessing
the earthquake risk, benefit-cost analyses are carried out for each of the four safety
counter-measures. The design of the most cost efficient plans for both single and multiple
track strengthening projects are studied here. Based on the benefit-cost analyses, the thesis
uses a case study to develop a safety management plan in terms of allocating the invest-
ment among the counter-measures to reduce the earthquake risk. In the case study, the
optimal investment allocation plans are obtained under different budget restrictions. When
the risk level decreases, the marginal investment for reducing one additional unit of risk
increases no matter which safety counter-measures are used as the optimal. In addition, if
different risk measures in terms of different conversion factors to calculate the PSPI are
used, the optimal investment plan may be different.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Title: JR East Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Being the largest regional passenger railroad in Japan, and, in fact, the largest passenger
railroad in the world which carries about 15 million passengers per day, runs 12,000 trains
per day and provides 100 billion passenger-km of service per year, the East Japan Railway
Company (JR East) has given top priority to safety since it was founded in 1987. It has
taken a very active role in the world of research and development with programs in the
safety area. Among these is the JR East/MIT joint research program in rail risk assess-
ment, which will be introduced in more detail in the following sections. The research pre-
sented in this thesis is sponsored by this program. It includes evaluation of various
alternative strategies to improve railroad safety with respect to earthquakes.
Although seismic disasters have low probability, the damage consequences to the railroad
facilities and passengers are very large. Also, because of this low probability, there are few
historical data available for reference. All the above reasons make the seismic risk assess-
ment research to be considered important by JR East, not only for the Shinkansen high
speed passenger train system but also for the conventional railroad system. The require-
ment for such was highlighted by the Kobe earthquake.
On January 17, 1995, an earthquake of magnitude 7.2 in Richter Scale in the Kobe region
caused severe damage to the railway infrastructure and facilities in that area, especially
those of JR West and JR Central. The damages included the collapse of girder bridges and
elevated sections of high-speed and conventional lines, and the derailment of many com-
muter trains. Fifteen trains that were running in the affected area crashed. The total cost of
repairs to tracks and structures was assessed at 412 billion yen (US$4.15 billion) by the
Ministry of Transport of Japan. Although JR East did not suffer damages in the
Figure 1.1: Network map of JR East
11
earthquake, it is potentially vulnerable to moderate local seismicity and to the more fre-
quent and more intense earthquakes that originate in the subduction zone off the eastern
coast of Japan.
Therefore, improving the various facilities of the whole system to protect railroad property
and passengers against earthquakes in the long run is a concern of JR East. But where to
invest and how to allocate limited funds in order to achieve the best safety improvement,
in turn, becomes an important topic worthy to be studied carefully. This is also the major
task of this research.
There are various safety counter-measures that may be helpful to improve earthquake-
related safety. The followings are several counter-measures regarded by JR East:
1) Strengthening the tracks,
2) Retrofitting the rail viaducts,
3) Installing earthquake early warning systems,
4) Improving braking systems,
5) Reducing the operating speed of trains.
Before describing the individual counter-measures in a greater detail in the next section,
we should first discuss the cost structures of these strategies briefly, especially the first
four counter-measures because reducing operating speed actually does not need invest-
ment.
As for the earthquake warning and braking systems, the costs are different for different
types of systems. Usually, the more advanced technology involved, the higher the cost will
be. But for track strengthening projects, the situation is more complex. Since the costs for
strengthening the tracks depend on not only the amount of strengthening, but also the con-
struction speed of the projects which affects the risk reduction directly. For example, if we
proceed all the strengthening projects with a high speed, the costs will likely be very high.
But if we take a long time to finish the projects, then the chance for the unprotected rail-
road to be exposed to earthquakes will be increased. Thus, we need to balance the risk
reduction with the costs.
Furthermore, there are interactive relationships between these counter-measures in terms
of earthquake risk reduction. If the track condition is very good, we may not need substan-
tial investment on warning and braking systems (In the extreme condition, the track can-
not be broken by the earthquake shaking and we need no warning system). On the other
hand, if we have very good earthquake warning systems, the requirement for the braking
systems could be relatively lower. These interactive relationships make the optimization
analysis more interesting, and, at the same time, more complicated.
1.2 Safety counter-measures to protect railroads against
earthquakes
As we mentioned in the above section, we will describe the safety counter-measures with
respect to reducing earthquake risks in more detail.
1.2.1 Track strengthening projects
Track strengthening means enhancing the strength of tracks and their bases so as to reduce
the track failure rate and degree of damage during severe earthquakes. Actually, track
strengthening here includes not only the actions of strengthening the rails but also actions
such as strengthening the track bases.
The advantages of the track strengthening include improving the overall safety condition
of the rail lines. It will bring benefits for reducing risks not only of earthquakes but also of
other natural disasters, such as rainfall and landslides.
Track strengthening also has its disadvantages. This includes the extremely high invest-
ment and effects on the traffic operations, such as reduction of traffic volume and hence
revenue loss when the projects are in process.
1.2.2 Retrofitting the rail viaducts
Since a large percentage of the Shinkansen lines was built on concrete viaducts which are
relatively more vulnerable to earthquakes compared with normal lines, then retrofitting the
rail viaducts is also a concern for reducing the earthquake risks.
Retrofitting the rail viaducts means enhancing the strength of columns of the viaducts by
increasing the cross-section area or improving the damage resistance of the columns, and
therefore reducing the column failure rates as well as the track failure rates during severe
earthquakes. In this research, retrofitting the rail viaducts is not only referred to the actions
of strengthening the viaduct columns but also to the actions of strengthening the associ-
ated tracks of the viaduct lines.
Similar to the track strengthening counter-measure, retrofitting the rail viaducts also has
its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of the viaduct retrofitting include
improving the overall safety condition of the rail lines. It will bring benefits for reducing
risks not only of earthquakes but also of other natural disasters, such as rainfall and land-
slides.
Also similar to track strengthening, the disadvantages of retrofitting viaducts include the
extremely high investment and effects on the traffic operations, such as reduction of traffic
volume and hence cause revenue loss when the projects are in process.
Also similar to the track strengthening counter-measure, the disadvantages of retrofitting
viaducts include the extremely high investment for proceeding with the projects and the
effects on the traffic operations, which may reduce traffic volume and then cause revenue
loss when the projects are in process.
1.2.3 Early warning systems
The early warning system is designed to provide early detection of arriving seismic
waves, thus allowing early emergency braking of the trains. Through emergency braking,
the early warning system reduces the distance traveled by trains on potentially damaged
tracks and therefore reduces the risk of severe accidents like derailments, which under
seismic conditions occur mainly when a running train encounters a damaged section of the
track. Then, the costs are as high as track strengthening or viaduct retrofitting.
The main disadvantage of this counter-measure is that the effectiveness of the warning
systems depends on the operation strategies. For example, the effectiveness is related to
the earthquake intensity parameters used to determine the triggering of various actions,
such as emergency braking, track inspection, and resumption of operation. If the operation
strategies are not "perfect", there will be losses caused by unnecessary train cancellations
and delays. Unfortunately, to have a "perfect" operation strategy of the early warning sys-
tem is extremely difficult.
1.2.4 Advanced emergency braking system
As mentioned in the advantages of the early warning systems, advanced emergency brak-
ing systems can reduce the distance and time traveled by trains on potentially damaged
tracks and therefore reduce the risk of severe accidents like derailments.
In addition to the advantage of reducing the earthquake risks the emergency braking sys-
tems can also be significantly effective when other hazard conditions occur.
1.2.5 Reducing the operating speed of trains
Another option to reduce the earthquake risk is to lower the operating speed of trains. This
safety counter-measure can reduce train derailment risk caused by earthquakes because
lower speed trains can be stopped in shorter distance by emergency braking.
But there is an obvious disadvantage associated with this counter-measure. Lower operat-
ing speed may result in the loss of revenues and reduce the level of service. Assume that
for a preliminary analysis, we ignore the loss caused by the reduction of level of service
(which may induce the long-run demand decline and is difficult to measure) and only con-
sider the possible revenue loss caused by the reduction of operating speed itself, we can
think it in the following way:
To keep the revenue the same as before the operating speed is reduced without changing
the total number of trains operated, the average headways of the trains in the whole system
have to be decreased. But the decreased headways of trains could in turn increase the
earthquake risk because more trains will be exposed in a certain area if an earthquake
strikes there. If the risk increased by the shorter headways is dominated by the benefit by
the lower train operating speed, then the reduction of the operating speed is worthwhile.
Otherwise, it would not be recommended. Usually, the minimum headways are set by tak-
ing other railroad risks into account (not necessarily those consequences related to earth-
quakes). So we may not have much room to manipulate the train headways. However, we
can still choose the possible alternative operating speeds and their corresponding head-
ways and carry out the corresponding the risk benefit analysis.
As discussed above, all the strategies have their own advantages and disadvantages. Fur-
thermore, these advantages and disadvantages are interdependent sometimes. For exam-
ple, the effectiveness of a early warning system would depend on well implemented
braking systems. Good track condition brought by track strengthening projects will make
the operation of early warning system optimized (For example, the warning for minor
earthquakes can be ignored and therefore many unnecessary train delays and cancellations
can be avoided). So we should not only evaluate these counter-measures individually but
also should consider their interdependencies when carrying out the risk-benefit analyses.
1.3 JR East/ MIT joint risk assessment program
According to Sussman, 1995, the JR East/MIT joint Research Program in Risk Assess-
ment began in January 1992. The project was conceived as a joint research program in the
risk assessment area involving activities both at MIT and at JR East.
At MIT, many faculty and staff members along with students from various academic
departments and centers such as Civil and Environmental Engineering, Aeronautics and
Astronautics and Sloan School of Management, Center for Transportation Study and
Operations Research Center participated in a variety of topics. In the aspect of JR East, the
staff members of the Safety Research Laboratory at JR East and other JR East divisions
such as Technical Research and Development Department, Technical Center and Interna-
tional Department also carried on parallel activities in the area.
As we have mentioned in the beginning, JR East has established safety as its top priority.
Only through the risk assessment analysis can JR East determine an effective investment
in improving safety. At the same time, MIT have carried out a lot of research in the area of
risk assessment for nuclear and transportation safety. Therefore, a program in the risk
assessment area was developed.
Since the beginning of this project, many topics have been carried out, according to Suss-
man, 1995, including:
* Development of safety indices for JR East operations
* Analysis of level-crossing safety from a risk assessment perspective
* Derailment analyses
* Risk assessment perspective on earthquake sensing and train operating policies
* Construction program design
* Risk assessment in the context of the 1995 Kobe earthquake
* Human factors analyses--rolling-stock maintenance
* Hazards due to rainfall
* Signal overruns
The program has proven to be a broadening experience for both MIT and JR East. A num-
ber of research documents have been produced and it is expected that some of the findings
of the research will be reflected in JR East policies and practices in the future.
1.4 Research statement
Risk Assessment
Optimization
Earthquake Safety Management Plan
Warning Systems I I Braking Systems
Track Strengthening Viaduct Retrofitting
Budget Flow
Figure 1.2: Simplified framework of the thesis
The research described here aims to provide JR East a set of methodologies to optimize
the allocation of its earthquake safety investment by implementing modem risk assess-
ment concepts such as safety performance indices, safety management plans and benefit-
cost analyses.
The research includes three major parts:
1) Review the risk assessment concepts and select the appropriate criteria for cost-
benefit comparison,
2) Model the earthquake risks and their effects on the railroad with and without the
various safety improvement counter-measures,
3) Use case studies to explain the principles of developing safety management plans
for allocating safety investment against earthquake threat.
First, the research reviews the concepts and methodologies of risk assessment technology
and examines the cost-benefit criteria including NPV value, Benefit/Cost Ratio and Invest-
ment Return Rate which can be used in a safety management plan. Both NPV values and
B/C Ratios are used for the unlimited and limited budget situations. The NPV values are
more suitable in the situation when the budget is adequate while the B/C Ratios are more
likely to be used in a tight budget situation.
Secondly, the risks to the railroad, trains and passengers in a damage region of an earth-
quake are determined by models using a variety of appropriate assumptions. The associ-
ated cost and benefit comparisons for the safety improvement counter-measures, such as
track strengthening projects, retrofitting rail viaducts, installing earthquake early warning
systems and improving braking systems, are therefore presented. The benefits of the
counter-measures here are regarded as the reduction of the monetary measured risks
caused by earthquakes compared to the condition before the corresponding safety counter-
measures are implemented. The frameworks of the cost-benefit analyses for designing of
the track strengthening program, viaduct retrofitting program, choosing early warning sys-
tems and braking systems are presented separately.
Finally, a safety management plan is provide in a simple network case. The plan can tell us
how to invest for improving earthquake safety in the most efficient way if there is a certain
budget for the total investment.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1 was presented the motivation and background of this research, and then intro-
duces the earthquake safety counter-measures which will be evaluated in the following
chapters. The outline of the thesis is also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts of risk assessment technology which are essential
to the development of this research. First, the definition of "risk" is presented, followed by
a review of the fundamental steps and methodologies of the modem risk assessment the-
ory. Then, the definitions and applications of the Safety Performance Index and Perceived
Safety Performance Index are introduced. After that, economic analysis methodologies
which include the cost-benefit analyses and optimal investment allocation are presented in
detail. Finally, the concept of a safety management plan is described.
Chapter 3 focuses on the earthquake risk assessment to railroads. At first, some earthquake
assessment related concepts such as seismic Zoning and Microzoning maps are described
briefly. Then follows the assessment of the earthquake consequences to the railroads.
Models are presented to evaluate the earthquake risks to the railroad property and passen-
gers, and calculate the monetary collective risks.
Chapter 4 presents the frameworks of cost-benefit analyses for the safety counter-mea-
sures corresponding to the earthquake threat. It starts with the frameworks of cost-benefit
analysis for designing the track strengthening program. Then similar analysis for early
warning system and advanced braking system are discussed. Optimal strategies of imple-
menting these three counter-measures individually can be given by the models.
Chapter 5 uses two case studies of a simple railroad network to present the safety manage-
ment plans for allocating the safety investment among the safety counter-measures to
reduce earthquake risks. One case study is for a surface line, while the other is for a via-
duct line.
Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and provides the recommendation to JR East according to
the results of this research.
Chapter 2
Basic Concepts of Risk Assessment
Methodology
In the first chapter, we presented the background and motivation of this research and gave
a brief introduction of the content of the research is about. In this chapter, we will review
the relevant literature on the risk assessment methodology which forms the basis for the
research.
2.1 Overview of modern risk assessment
Before presenting the research about the assessment of earthquake risks to the railroad and
safety management plan to allocate the safety investment, we first introduce the funda-
mental concepts and methodologies in the field of modem risk assessment. By reviewing
various literatures and previous works which have been done in the JR East/ MIT risk
assessment project, this chapter will provide the readers with some basic knowledge of
this field and help them to understand this research work.
2.1.1 'Risk' and 'risk assessment'
First of all, the notion of risk is the most fundamental block for the risk assessment meth-
odology. In general, risk can be defined as the average "cost" per unit of time due to the
occurrence of unwanted events [Odoni, 1993]. This definition applies to any type of risk
and to any environment. Specially, in the realm of transportation, risk can be defined as the
product of the "average number of accidents per unit of time (in other words, the probabil-
ity that an accident will occur)" multiplied by the "average cost per accident". Using an
equation, it is:
Risk(i) = P(i) xC(i)
where p(i) is the probability of accident i,
C(i) is the cost of accident i.
The cost of an accident can be measured in terms of the number of fatalities or/and injuries
that may result from the accidents, or it can be measured by the monetary amount of eco-
nomic losses.
From the definition of risk, we can see that, independent of the units used to measure
costs, risk can be reduced by either reducing the frequency of accidents or by reducing the
consequences of an accident (in other words, the average cost per accident) or both. A
large part of a risk assessment study is, in fact, concerned with identifying the most effec-
tive way to reduce the probability of accidents or the average cost of an accident when it
occurs [Odoni, 1993].
2.1.2 Fundamental steps and methodologies of modern risk assessment
Modem risk assessment assists transportation professionals in deciding how much should
be invested to reduce risk and how such investments should be allocated among the vari-
ous potential alternatives. There are three steps to achieve this purpose:
1) Safety analysis
2) Risk appraisal
3) Economic analysis
The first step, safety analysis (or 'risk analysis') is the technical part of a risk assessment
study. In this step, probabilities of various types of accidents and their consequences in
terms of fatalities, injuries, property damages and interruption of services are identified
and assessed. The effects of alternative investments for reducing risk on these probabili-
ties and on the consequences of accidents should also be estimated.
(2.1)
To perform a good safety analysis, one must use a combination of methodologies. At first,
one has to understand the physical properties, the technologies of each individual compo-
nent and of the system as a whole. Secondly, one must use the probabilistic models, such
as reliability theory, fault-tree and event-tree analysis, or statistical analysis of failure and
accident data, to assess the risks.That is, (1) Identify adverse events, (2) Quantify their
probability of occurrence, (3) Define and measure their expected consequences, (4) Sum
over the system being analyzed.
The second step, risk appraisal, assesses and compares the relative importance of different
types of failures or accidents. It also determines what is the appropriate level of safety that
we should try to achieve.
To carry out the risk appraisal analysis, a measure of the overall risk of a system--the mon-
etary collective risk need to be calculated first. To get this measurement, one needs to
understand how individuals and society perceive risk. A good example is stated by Suss-
man and Roth, 1994; the deaths of 47 people in the 1993 Amtrak's derailment in Alabama
received much more than 47 times the coverage and concern of the death of a single indi-
vidual, say, in a grade crossing accident. That tells us when we try to calculate the mone-
tary collective risk of an accident or that of a system, we must be careful about the societal
valuation of risk. The calculation of monetary collective risk in this context will be
explained in more detail in the following section when we introduce the safety perfor-
mance indices.
Finally, the economic analysis will lead to an optimal allocation of resources. In this step,
we need to understand the relationship between investment and safety; in other words,
what level of safety can be achieved at each different possible level of investment. After
this relationship is understood, we can decide how much to invest on safety improvements
and where to invest.
The methodologies for economic analysis include cost-benefit analyses and optimal allo-
cation of resources. One thing which needs to be noted here is that the successful selection
of the optimal combination of investment can take place only after the appropriate cost-
benefit analyses has been completed. These methodologies will also be examined and
explained in the following sections.
2.2 Safety performance indices
The Safety Performance Index (SPI) and the Perceived Safety Performance Index (PSPI)
were developed to monitor the global real and perceived safety performance of a system.
The concepts of the Safety Performance Index and the Perceived Safety Performance
Index are essential since only after the safety performance of a system is monitored, can
we measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the safety investment.
2.2.1 Safety Performance Index (SPI)
According to Nasser, 1995, the Safety Performance Index, also identified as the real safety
performance index, is the sum of the frequencies of safety outcome, such as material and
human casualties, weighted by their costs. It is defined as:
I
SPI= pi *xi (2.2)
i=l
where SPI is the Safety Performance Index of System S,
xi is the consequence associated with adverse event i,
pi is the probability of adverse event i.
As we have mentioned in the previous section, when conducting the risk appraisal analy-
sis, we need to calculate the monetary collective risk; SPI provides such a tool. To
describe this calculation more deeply, some issues about value of life need to be presented
at first.
In the calculation of SPI (quantitatively monetary collective risk) of a transportation sys-
tem, we often need to quantify the human damage consequences like injury and fatality,
which requires us to estimate the value of life. There are currently two coexisting method-
ologies in the realm of life valuation: the first one is based on human capital theory, while
the second is based on the willingness-to-pay approach.
The human capital theory is constructed upon the argument that the value that society
should attach to the loss of one life is precisely the cost to society of the loss of this life
such as damage to property, medical costs, administrative costs, net present value of the
net reduction in output, pain and suffering imposed upon the relatives [Nasser, 1995]. By
estimating and quantifying these cost portions, one can then get the value of life.
The second approach to determine the value of life is the willingness-to-pay theory. This
approach assumes the risk to life can be treated as any other economic good, using the
appropriate tools of expected utility theory. The value of life is certainly not uniform
across all segments of the population. Obviously, affluent people are willing to pay higher
sums for a decrease in their probability of death. A comprehensive survey of this approach
can also be found in Nasser, 1995.
The willingness-to-pay approach has more economic and behavioral meanings compared
to the human capital theory; hence it is more popular recently than the latter. We will adopt
this approach in our research.
2.2.2 Perceived Safety Performance Index (PSPI)
The Perceived Safety Performance Index considers the distortion of individual perception
of risks which induce non-linearity and require conversion factors in the valuation of risk.
The distortions include: (1) mis-perception of the likelihood of events; and (2) heterogene-
ity in the valuation of risk across the attributes of risk. In other words, the Perceived
Safety Performance Index is the sum of the frequencies of safety outcomes weighted by
their costs along with risk conversion factors that account for the non-linearity in the per-
ception of risk. It calculate the perceived monetary collective risk of an accident or that of
a system. The PSPI can be defined as:
I
PSPI = (Pi xi) (2.3)
i=l
where PSPI 1 is the Perceived Safety Performance Index of System S,
a is the risk conversion power factor (a>=1).
Usually, for perceived risk, a is always greater than one. If a is equal to one, then the PSPI
equals to SPI. The risk conversion power factor relates the magnitude of accident conse-
quences to the measure of risks. It actually reflects the distortion to the real individual
risks by the society. For example, the public have different perceived risk between cata-
strophic accidents and ordinary accidents, in this situation, a is greater than one. In addi-
tional, different a indicates the different way of how people perceive the risk; the greater
a is, the more different people perceive the risk with different consequences.
In this research, we consider the conversion factors pertaining to the difference between
catastrophic vs. ordinary accidents, since the train accidents caused by earthquakes, espe-
cially those involving high speed trains can lead to catastrophic accidents which may
cause hundreds of deaths. For example, the perceived risk for a fatality in a catastrophic
accident that causes 100 fatalities will be much larger than that of a fatality in an accident
that cause only one fatality because people will pay more attention to the 100-fatality acci-
dent than the total of the 100 1-fatality accidents. This is demonstrated by the immense
and intense 'non-linear' media coverage.
Actually, not only the users of transportation systems and the general public perceive the
catastrophic accidents conversely but also the owner of the transportation systems like JR
1. In Nasser, 1995, the definition of PSPI is slightly different. That is:
I
PSPI = 1 acpixi
i=l 1
where ai is called the conversion factor, which is associated with each outcome. In this definition,
the conversion factors for different type of accidents are different. For example, the conversion fac-
tors are different between catastrophic accidents and ordinary accidents.
East. The safety reputation of the company can impact its revenue a lot. Sometimes a cat-
astrophic accident can even lead to the bankruptcy of a company or cause stricter regula-
tions which may affect future business of the companies. So transportation companies also
perceive the catastrophic accidents very negatively.
There are some difference between the general public and the transportation companies in
the way they perceive the accidents. Usually, general public perceive no difference
between the deaths while the transportation companies are concerned the deaths that they
are responsible for. For example, in a 20-fatality level crossing accident, all the deaths are
third-party people but not passengers and employees and the accident is not the train's or
signal's fault. The railroad company is not as seriously concerned about the accident as the
general public.
From the definitions, it is clear that SPI measures the real cost of safety from the perspec-
tive of the operator while PSPI represents the cost of safety as perceived by the users of
the transportation system and the general public. These two indices provide us the mea-
sures for both real and perceived safety performance.
2.3 Economic analysis
Economic analysis is the third and also the key stage in risk assessment. Since one of the
major purposes of risk assessment is to allocate the safety investment to maximize the risk
reduction in the most efficient way. As mentioned before, the methodologies for economic
analysis include cost-benefit analyses and optimal allocation of investment. Each of them
will be described in detail in the following section.
2.3.1 Cost-benefit analysis
According to Zerbe and Dively, 1994, the cost-benefit analysis is a set of procedures used
for decision-making by defining and comparing benefits and costs. Generally, the types of
choice facing the decision-maker can be classified as follows:
1) Accept-reject. Facing a set of independent projects and no constraint on the number
which can be undertaken, the decision-maker must decide which projects, if any, are
worthwhile.
2) Ranking. If there exits some constraints, such as budget limits, then all "acceptable"
projects cannot be undertaken. In this case, projects must be ranked in terms of objec-
tive function.
3) Choosing between exclusive projects. Frequently, projects are not independent of
each other. One form of interdependence exists when one project can only be under
taken to the exclusion of another project, e.g. two different ways to achieve the same
objective. Another special case of exclusion exists when any given project can be
undertaken now or in a later period. There is a problem of choosing the optimal point
in time to start the project.
The steps of cost-benefit analysis include:
1) Define the problem to be analyzed and identify the objective of this problem.
2) Find as many feasible alternatives as possible.
3) Choose a technique and appropriate criteria to value the uncertainty and the
consequences.
4) Draw together the results of the cost-benefit analysis, recommend the choices and
make decisions.
Among the four steps, step 2) is crucial to a successful analysis while step 3) is the heart of
the cost-benefit analysis. Obviously, if the alternative set is not complete, some superior
choices would not even be considered. In this sense, the cost-benefit analysis would lose
its strength. The criteria and techniques for the cost-benefit analysis are introduced below:.
Generally, there are three criteria of cost-benefit analyses, which will be then described in
the following sections:
1) Net Present Value (NPV);
2) Benefit cost ratio (B/C);
3) Investment return ratio (IRR).
1. Net Present Value (NPV) criterion
At first, we need to clarify the idea that benefits and costs accrue at different point in time.
This is easily understood from the economic principle that investment in capital projects
involves the sacrifice of present benefits in favor of future benefits. The sacrifice of
present consumption would not be worth while unless the gains in future consumption are
greater. This principle acknowledges the existence of "social time preference" --a prefer-
ence which society supposedly exhibits for present benefit over future benefits.
Then, to compare the benefits and costs, we need to discount all the benefits and costs in
the value at a same time by the social rate of discount, usually the present time is chosen
as the base time. This leads to the definition of Present Value:
PV= t (2.4)
t=o(1 +r)
where r is the social discount (interest) rate.
The Net Present Value of Cost and Benefit of Project A is defined as following:
T B(A)t-C(A) t  (2.5)NPV (A) = t (2.5)
t=o (l+r)
where B(A) t and C(A)t are the benefit and cost of project A at time t, respectively.
The decision rule for accepting project A is only when the Net Present Value of A is
greater than zero, that is, the discounted benefits should exceed discounted costs.
2. Benefit/ Cost Ratio criterion:
The definition of Benefit/Cost Ratio is another criterion. The definition of the Benefit/Cost
Ratio for project A can be expressed as the ratio of the present value of benefits and costs
of project A:
B/C (A) = (2.6)
t=0
Usually, the project will be accepted as long as the ratio exceeds one.
3. Internal Rate of Return criterion:
The present value rule requires the use of some predetermined social discount rate to dis-
count future benefits and costs. An alternative rule is to calculate the discount rate which
would give the project an NPV of zero and then to compare this "solution rate" with the
predetermined social discounted rate. This "solution rate" is called the "Internal Rate of
Return", also called the "marginal efficiency of investment".
In other words, the Internal Rate of Return of project A is the solution of the equation:
T B(A) t-C(A)
t1 =t
t = 0 (1 +r) (2.7)
Where i is the Internal Rate of Return of project A.
The decision rule for accepting project A by using the Internal Rate of Return is only
when the Internal Rate of Return is greater than the predetermined social discounted rate.
2.3.2 Optimal allocation of investment
The optimal allocation of investment is another methodology which can be used in eco-
nomic analysis in risk assessment besides cost-benefit analysis. It takes care of society's
interest in an efficient allocation of its resources.
The problem is a classical optimization problem and can be solved by the marginal-cost-
criterion. This criterion allocates resources in such a way that the marginal cost for risk
reduction is equal for all subsystems [Bohnenblust, 1995]. It is always possible to reduce
the risk by an additional unit of investment. But the incremental costs needed for reducing
risk by an additional unit increases as the risk becomes smaller. With resources always
being limited, the money spent at one place will be lacking at another. Hence, the limited
funds for safety counter-measures must be used in such a way that a maximum level of
safety is achieved. That is, we have to stop our efforts at a certain slope of the risk /cost
diagram for any system we interested as shown in Figure 2.1.
For every level of investment, we can determine the optimal risk reduction given by the
lowest level of risk that can be achieved for this investment. But at first, we need to choose
the proper level of investment. The slope which is the optimal safety criterion from the
society's point of view is actually the price that one pays for a marginal increase in safety.
If we derive the optimal level of investment in terms of maximizing net benefits, the solu-
tion to the benefit maximization problem is to set the marginal risk reduction per unit of
investment equal to -11. In Figure 2.1, the optimal point is A and the corresponding invest-
ment level is C*.
In reality, our objective for safety improvement is often constrained by the budget limita-
tion. Then we have to focus on the suboptimal resulting of investment. Assume a certain
budget exists, then in Figure 2.1, the suboptimal investment point is B. There are three sit-
uations: 1) Budget<C*, we cannot invest enough on safety to achieve the optimal risk
reduction; 2)Budget=C*, the investment is optimal; 3) Budget>C*, we overspend on
safety.
1. [Nasser, 1995] gives the derivation of this problem in pg 57.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Risk Reduction Investment
2.4 The Safety management plan
2.4.1 What is a safety management plan?
A safety management plan is an action-oriented decision-aiding tool based on risk assess-
ment technics. It takes a holistic view in the sense that it requires all safety issues to be
evaluated by the same rules and that these rules are embedded in the organization or com-
pany's overall objectives [Bohnenblust, 1995]. The concept of safety management plan is
important for risk assessment analysis since it is actually the purpose of the risk assess-
ment. Once the safety management plan is given, the decision maker will know where and
how to invest in safety.
The general characteristics of a safety management plan are described below:
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First and foremost, it focuses on the optimal allocation of resources. Cost effectiveness is
of most concern. It ensures obtaining maximum safety for the money spent.
Secondly, it allows linking facts and values. Safety planning requires knowledge about the
technical and scientific facts of the processes related to a company's activities. It ensures
consistent and transparent decisions. Numerous decisions have to be taken in the rail sys-
tem. The decisions range from the daily decisions made to the strategic decision. Many of
these decisions affect safety issues. The safety management plan helps to ensure that these
decisions are made in a consistent way with respect to safety.
At last, it eases communication about safety among specialists, and with the public and
authorities and allows controlling the effectiveness of action taken. By using a systematic,
analytic framework, the effectiveness of safety counter-measures can be shown.
2.4.2 Elements of a safety management plan
Bohnenblust, Sussman and Odoni, 1995 gave the definition of the elements of a safety
management plan: A safety management plan consists not only of an analytic framework,
but includes process-oriented elements as well, since providing safety is not a one time
action, but a continuing, dynamic process. There are three elements included which are
safety policy statement, organizational structure and risk-based safety analysis. Figure 2.2
indicates the relationships between the three elements of a safety management plan.
Figure 2.2: The three elements of a safety management plan
[Bohnenblust, Sussman and Odoni, 1995]
Among these three elements, in this thesis, we focus on the risk-based safety analysis,
since no change or improvement can be achieved without being able to rely on appropriate
tools and methods. A risk-based safety model is an appropriate tool to pursue an action-
oriented course which is focused on the optimal allocation of the scarce resources
The safety policy statement describes the company's vision with respect to safety. It
includes the guiding ideas which lead the company and its employees while acting on
safety issues. It allows top management to delegate safety decisions to the appropriate
management level and to ensure that all decisions will be consistent.
In this chapter, we reviewed and introduced the basic concepts of the risk assessment
methodology. In the next chapter, we will employ these concepts and principles to present
the earthquake risk assessment models for the railroads, which is the basis of the risk-ben-
efit analysis for allocating the investment in earthquake safety.
Safety Policy Statement
Organizational Structure Risk-Based Safety Analysisl
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Chapter 3
Earthquake Risk Assessment of Railroads
3.1 Evaluating the earthquake risk of railroads
The serious damages caused by earthquakes are well known. Their extensive devastation
affecting the economy of countries prone to high seismicity shows that vigorous measures
should be undertaken to reduce the loss of life and property during catastrophic earth-
quakes. Japan is near the high seismic risk zone. In addition, railroads, especially high
speed railroads, are high investment and utilization infrastructures. So it is important to
evaluate the earthquake risks to the railroads and protect them against earthquakes.
In this chapter, we will present the model for assessing the earthquake risk of railroads.
Before describe the probabilistic model in more detail, we first introduce some earthquake
assessment concepts such as seismic zoning and micro zoning, which are important for
implementing our risk assessment of railroads related to earthquakes.
3.1.1 Seismic zoning and microzoning
According to Walker, 1982, seismic zoning is a procedure to provide knowledge of the
characteristics of probable future earthquakes. It must be stated at the outset that it neither
involves the influence of local soil conditions, nor engineering problems of soil-structure
interaction. The main product of seismic zoning is a seismic zoning map.
A zoning map of a region should be capable of predicting the future possible earthquake
sequences in the region. Each sequence is described at least by the times (frequency),
locations and magnitudes of future events.
While seismic zoning takes into account the distribution of earthquake hazard over the
entire country or region, seismic microzoning defines the detailed distribution of earth-
quake risk in each seismic zone.
Most studies show that the distribution of damage caused by earthquakes indicate that the
areas of severe damage are highly localized, and that the degree of damage may change
abruptly over distances as short as 0.5 to 1 km. Many geoscientists have been led to
believe that it is the local subsoil conditions that are of primary importance in the assess-
ment of damages to structures.
Japanese investigators began to develop the seismic microzoning methodology in 1950
based on their experience with past earthquake damage. Many cities in Japan published
seismic microzoning maps. All these maps present subdivisions of the city areas accord-
ing to soil conditions.
The methodology and criteria to develop the seismic zoning and microzoning maps are
too complicated and diverse and also not necessary to permit detailed discussion and doc-
umentation. But the basic idea is that, if the seismic zoning and microzoning maps of the
whole JR East area are available and could provide us with the information about the fre-
quency and location of major future earthquakes as well as the local soil conditions for
every microregion, it would be quite useful for us to assess the earthquake risks to the
whole system. In other words, the risk assessment of earthquake safety has to begin with
the seismic zoning and microzoning maps. That is why we give a brief introduction to the
seismic zoning and microzoning maps.
3.1.2 Consequences of earthquakes
Before evaluating and predicting the probabilistic earthquake risks to the railroads, it is
needed at first to assess all the possible consequences of earthquakes to the railroads. The
basic purpose of this work is to obtain a preliminary idea of damage in the event of severe
earthquakes. This kind of assessment should be made for JR East.
Catastrophic earthquakes and their secondary effects such as landslides and tsunamis can
cause severe damages to railroad facilities and properties such as rails, ballasts, bridges
tunnels, trains or even the communication and signal systems. Also the train derailments
and collisions caused by earthquakes can cause numerous passenger fatalities and injuries
especially when this happens to high speed trains.
Furthermore, the train delays and cancellations due to the earthquake strikes and the
repairs of the damaged facilities can also cause significant revenue losses to the railroads.
3.2 Earthquake risk assessment of railroads
As described in Section 3.1.1, we can obtain the information about potential earthquake
probabilities in the future for any possible small area in the whole railroad regions from
the seismic zoning and microzoning maps. Then we can always divide the whole system
into many small exclusive subareas each of which has the same probability of severe
earthquakes (To be simple but not lose the significance, here, we only consider severe
earthquakes with a certain range of magnitudes, e.g, M>=6.5) and roughly same soil con-
ditions. For example, there may exist a subarea with a track length of K kilometers.
Also we could know all the possible adverse consequences caused by a severe earthquake;
then we could model the risks.
3.2.1 Assumptions and descriptions
We first set out some notions and describe several assumptions that we will invoke
throughout our work.
1. Probability issues:
1) PO (times/year): Probability that an earthquake (greater than M6.5 in magnitude) will
strike in the project area per year.
2) The track failures caused by an earthquake follow a homogeneous spatial Poisson pro-
cess with rate X (failures/km). Tracks with different qualities as well as with different local
soil conditions are associated with different values of X. So, X can indicate the safety con-
ditions of the tracks. Construction program can be implemented which lower the value of
X. This is one of the counter-measures we study in this thesis.
2. Discount and inflation issues:
i: JR East's discount rate,
j: real expected inflation of labor and construction materials.
3. Risk issues:
1) Physical damages: Including the direct loss (repair cost) of the track and train damage
and the indirect loss (revenue loss caused by repair, which increases with the degree of
infrastructure damage.)
2) Fatalities and Injuries: The number of fatalities and injuries is very difficult to estimate
precisely. But the number should be closely related to the number of trains which would
possibly crash in the earthquake. Also it is reasonable to assume that the number of pas-
senger fatalities and injuries are proportional to the speed of the running train when it
crashes.
3.2.2 Modeling the earthquake risk of railroads
Here, we consider two kinds of track lines. One is the normal track lines whose failures in
an earthquake follow a homogeneous spatial Poisson process with rate X (failures/km).
The other is the viaduct track line whose failures are corresponding to the failures of the
columns which directly support them. Let us study them in turn.
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 explain the two kind of track failures caused by earthquakes,
respectively.
Track Failures (k)
Figure 3.1: Track failures of surface lines
Figure 3.2: Track failures of viaduct lines
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As stated above, the damages to the railways include physical damages and passenger
fatalities and injuries. We can evaluate them separately at first and then calculate the mon-
etary collective risks using the concepts of SPI and PSPI.
3.2.3 Risks associated with physical damages
At first, we consider the normal track lines (surface lines). We have assumed that the track
fails in a homogeneous spatial Poisson process with rate X. Then, the expected number of
failures of a K-kilometer-long normal track line in an earthquake is XK, for track with a
safety condition of X.
Then the consequence involved with track damages can be expressed as:
R (X) = K -K.dn+r(k) . (3.1)
where dn is the average repair cost of one normal track failure,
r(X) is the revenue loss caused by the track repair after the earthquake.
As for the viaduct lines, if we assume that the columns as well as the distances of columns
are same for any viaduct and we also will strengthen the columns to the same standard,
then the failure situation of the viaducts are very similar to that of the surface lines, since
we can assume the viaduct lines also as homogeneous lines. Then, to measure the risk of
viaduct lines, we can simply introduce a weighting factor w(s) (normally, w(s)>1), which
describes the fragility of the track structures on the viaducts across the region relative to
the strength of surface track. JR East engineers would have the specific expertise to con-
struct such a weighting function for each viaduct. So the track failure rate of lines on via-
ducts is:
XV (s) = w (s) • - (s) (3.2)
where X(s) is the track failure rate of normal lines at location s,
Xv(s) is the track failure rate of lines on viaducts at location s.
By now, we can use the same models to evaluate the earthquake risks by the surface line
failures and the line failures caused by column failures of viaducts.
3.2.4 Risks associated with passenger fatality and injury
Here, we use a simple model to estimate the number of passenger fatalities and injuries. At
first, assume that a train will derail and crash when it enters a track failure with a speed not
equal to zero. The distance to stop a train with emergency braking, x, can be calculated by:
2
x = (3.3)2a
where, Vo is normal operating speeds,
a is the emergency deceleration rate.
Then, if an earthquake strikes, the probability of a train crash when it is running on the
track with a failure rate of X is:
pd = p(DerailjlP0)= -p(O) = 1 0!x) -e (3.4)
Where Po is the probability of severe earthquakes which will occur per year,
p(O) is the probability that a running train will not enter one track failure
before it stops.
Now, let us consider what will happen in the K kilometer-long-track project area as shown
in Figure 3.1, when an earthquake strikes. Assume the average headway of the normally
operated trains is H, then about [K/H] (which means the largest integer less than or equal
to K/H) trains will be running on the tracks of the project area.
Since the number of passenger fatalities and injuries associated with a train derailment is
directly related to the train speed when the train crashes--the higher the speed, the more
fatalities and injuries will be involved, and vice verse. Train vehicle survivability in a
given crash scenario is a function of the kinematic behavior of the entire consist, the integ-
rity and collapse characteristics of the structure of each vehicle and the overall interior
configuration of a compartment and occupant/surface contact characteristics [Arthur D.
Little and Calspan Corporation, 1993]. It is reasonable to assume that the numbers of pas-
senger fatalities and injuries associated with one train derailment, say F and I, are propor-
tional to the kinetic energy at the moment before it derails. This means:
F = k 2IV -_2as) (3.5)
I = k2 (V- 2as) (3.6)
where, k1, k1 are parameters which are functions of the vehicle mass and structure
characteristics, etc.,
s is the train braking stop distance before it hits a track failure.
Then the expected number of fatalities and injuries of a train in an earthquake are:
x
F = fFf (s) ds (3.7)
0
x
I = fIf(s)ds (3.8)
0
where, x=V02/2a, which is the distance to stop a train with emergency braking,
f(s)=Xe-C s, which is the probability density function of exponential
distribution of s.
Now, the total expected number of fatalities and injuries by trains in the K kilometer-long
tracks in an earthquake are:
N
E (F) = (N-i).pF "P(N (1-pd (3.9)
i=0
Where N=[K/H] is the no. of trains running on tracks when an earthquake occurs.
E (I) = (N N - i) - (1-Pd)d (3.10)
i=0
Where E(I) is the expected number of passenger injury.
Also, the possible physical damages to the trains is:
R () 2 = DT- [(N - i)- (Ni) (1 - Pd) (3.11)
i=O0
Where DT is the average monetary damage to a crashed train.
3.2.5 Calculating the monetary collective risks
Now, we need to quantify the total risks involved in an earthquake. That is, the monetary
collective risks need to be calculated.
As we have stated in Chapter 2, we can calculate the monetary collective risks and per-
ceived monetary collective risks by using the concept of Safety Performance Index (SPI)
and Perceived Performance Index (PSPI). These two kinds of monetary collective risks
are from different points of view. While the monetary collective risk measures the real
cost of safety from the perspective of the operator (here, the railroad), the perceived mon-
etary collective risk measures the cost of safety as perceived by the users of the transporta-
tion system (here, the passengers) and the general public. Also we will use the
willingness-to-pay theory to determine the value of life here.
According to the definition of SPI, the monetary collective risk which will be involved in
K km long tracks when a severe earthquake strikes is:
CR (X) = R () +R () 2 +WF E (F) + WI E (I) (3.12)
Where CR(X) indicates the monetary collective risk,
WF is the willingness-to-pay for a death,
WI is the willingness-to-pay for a injury.
Similarly, according to the definition of PSPI, the perceived monetary collective risk
which will be involved in K km long tracks when a severe earthquake strikes is:
PCR() = R () + R () 2 + (WF E (F)) + (W 1 .E (I)) (3.13)
Where PCR(X) indicates the perceived monetary collective risk,
ox indicates the risk conversion power factor.
In this chapter, we developed probabilistic models to evaluate the earthquake risk
This chapter actually covers the first two steps of the risk assessment methodology, which
are safety analysis and risk appraisal. In the following chapter, we will employ the benefit-
cost analyses for alternative earthquake safety counter-measures. This is economic analy-
sis, which the third step of the risk assessment methodology.
Chapter 4
Risk-Benefit Analyses for the Safety
Counter-Measures
In this chapter, we will provide the frameworks to determine the optimal investment in
terms of risk reduction for every earthquake safety counter-measure such as track
strengthening project design, constructing early warning systems and installing advanced
braking systems, by appropriate risk-benefit analyses.
4.1 Track strengthening program design
As mentioned earlier, the 1995 Kobe earthquake caused severe damage to the railways in
that area. In the wake of the Kobe tragedy and in view of what was learned from it, accel-
eration of track strengthening projects on the JR East system seems to be a policy worthy
of consideration. This study takes initial steps on developing a framework by using a risk-
benefit analysis to determine how fast a set of construction projects should be completed
and the degree of strengthening that is appropriate.
The advantages of accelerating the track-strengthening projects are straightforward.
Strengthening rail tracks reduces the probability and consequences of damage to infra-
structure and trains, and passenger fatality and injury due to train crashes in future earth-
quakes. If a track-strengthening project is completed more quickly, that portion of the
railroad is exposed to earthquake damage for a shorter time.
Damage from an earthquake to the track where a project has been completed would be less
than if the track-strengthening project has not been started or is in the process of comple-
tion. More importantly, the probability of train accidents caused by failure of the track
infrastructure during an earthquake is lowered as well.
However, there are disadvantages to accelerating a multiple-project construction program
aimed at strengthening the railroad in anticipation of earthquakes---the construction cost
may be significantly greater because of the rushed construction and the interactions among
these multiple projects. The details will be discussed later when we are doing the cost
analysis and assuming the construction cost vs. project duration functions.
This section is aimed at developing a modeling framework that JR East could use to 1)
evaluate the trade-offs between track-strengthening programs involving multiple projects
and 2) search for optimal project schedules. The model uses a risk-benefit analysis frame-
work which balances the construction costs of the various ways of organizing the multiple
project program with the benefits that accrue to JR East from the safety improvements that
are derived from these construction programs. The model is necessarily probabilistic since
earthquakes, the prime motivation for this construction program, are by nature probabilis-
tic in magnitude and location.
In short, performing an accelerated construction program by starting track-strengthening
projects earlier and performing each project more quickly, has clear benefits because the
railroad is exposed to catastrophic earthquake damage and risk for a shorter period of
time. At the same time the construction costs of such an accelerated program can be
greater than a program extended over a longer period of time with less project simultane-
ity. The purpose of this model is to balance those costs and benefits.
4.1.1 Single project at one location:
In this section, we first consider a simple situation where only one track strengthening
project for surface lines is processed in the network and the length of the project is K km
with a homogeneous track failure rate X. Similar analysis will be carried out for lines on
viaducts. The risk-benefit modeling framework for single track strengthening project case
is shown in Figure 4.1
Figure 4.1: Risk-Benefit analysis framework for single project
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From the flowchart in Figure 4.1, it is clear that to carry out the cost-benefit analysis, we
need to first identify the costs and benefits associated with the events and then compare
them.
1. Cost analysis:
For the cost issues, we make the following assumption which will be valid throughout the
thesis. That is, for a given safety improvement requirement (X-X1), the average cost of
strengthening one kilometer's track (the direct cost of construction) changes only with the
construction rate of the project, which is defined as the kilometers strengthened per unit
time.
Furthermore, let us focus on the variable cost of construction. Considering an individual
project, construction costs are likely to be greater when this project is performed on an
accelerated basis. Completing the same amount of work in, for example, six months rather
than one year will lead to higher construction costs. Rush work (higher construction rate)
will lead to higher variable cost.
Levis (1967) gave the time(rate)-cost curves for construction activities and pointed out
that the total variable cost will increase or at least stay the same as project duration is
decreased because the constructor must employ additional resources to finish the activity
in less time as the economics law of diminishing returns takes effect. Lessard (1972) indi-
cated that the direct cost shows a minimum for 'normal' direct construction duration,
when project activities are performed at minimum cost with maximum efficiency. When
project duration is shorter, some activities have to be "crashed" (done more quickly) and
direct cost increases because of higher overtime wages, reduced crew productivity, etc. If
a project has a duration longer than its normal duration, crew productivity is below maxi-
mum efficiency and extra costs cover for idle manpower and for equipment. Figure 4.2
gives the cost-time diagram according to Lessard.
Cost
Cost
'Time
Crashed Normal
duration duration
Figure 4.2: Cost-time diagram by Lessard (1972)
If we know the direct cost, and according to the Poisson process assumption we made for
the track failure rates in Chapter 3, the annual cost of the track strengthening project can
be expressed as:
AC = C (K/T, h-• 1 ) -K+C 1  (4.1)
where, AC is the annual cost of the project,
T is the total construction time of the project,
K is the total length of tracks in the project,
X, X1 are the Poisson process rate of the track failures in an earthquake
before and after the project, respectively,
C(K/T, X-X 1) is the variable cost function of unit (per kilometer) track,
C1 is the fixed cost per year and the corresponding annual revenue loss
caused by the process of the project (due to train cancellations and delays).
Considering the time-value discounting of money, which means the cost coming sooner
will have a greater impact on total project cost, we can get the total completed project cost
(in constant money value at present t=O):
II--
T
TC = [AC S - + L + CF (4.2)
= 1 (1 + i)
where, TC is the total completed project cost (t=O),
L is the useful lifetime of the project,
S is the salvage value of per km track after the useful lifetime of the project
is over,
CF is the fixed cost for setting up the project (assumed to occur at t=O).
Here, we assume CF=O for simplicity.
2. Benefit analysis:
To estimate the benefit of the project, we measure the expected reduction of physical
(track) damages to the railway in an earthquake with and without the project. This is a
measure of the reduction of earthquake risks by the safety counter-measures. If a earth-
quake happens, there will be two situations: one is that the earthquake strikes during the
project and the other is that it strikes after the project is completed (remember that we
have assumed that the project begins at t=O). We can consider the benefit in each of the
two situations under the assumption that an earthquake actually strikes.
In Chapter 3, the models of assessing the earthquake risks have already been developed.
The collective and perceived monetary collective risks are given in Equations 3.12 and
3.13. It is easy to show that if an earthquake strikes after the project is over, the benefit
from the project which improves the track safety condition from X to X, is:
B = CR (.) - CR (X1) (4.3)
where CR(X), CR(X1) are the monetary collective risks with and without the
project, respectively.
Or, if according to the perceived monetary collective risks, the benefit is:
PB = PCR (X) - PCR(Xl1) (4.4)
where PCR(X), PCR(kL1) are the perceived monetary collective risks with and
without the project, respectively.
But the earthquakes can also strike during the construction period. In this situation, the
benefit as well as the cost are assumed proportional to the completed portion of the
project.
3. Optimization analyses:
Here, we carry out the cost-benefit analysis for one project (subsequent work will consider
multiple projects); it is reasonable to assume that the project will begin at t=O because
there is no reason to delay unless there are no funds available (in which situation, the
project won't be considered).
If we assume that AC occurs at the end of the construction year (here, we assume the
annual costs are the same for each year) and use B to indicate the benefit associated with
the project, the cost-benefit stream diagram of a 3-year project (i.e., a project planned for a
three year duration) is as shown in Figure 4.3, where p(t=n) means the probability of the
first earthquake strikes in year t=n.
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Figure 4.3: Cost-benefit stream diagram of the single track-strengthening project
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The probability tree of the time that an earthquake will happen is as shown in Figure 4.4, L
indicates the economic lifetime of the project. So, if we let Po indicates the earthquake
probability per year, the probability that an earthquake will happen by year t is:
p(t= 1)=Po
p(t=2)=Po(1-P o)
p(t=k)=Po(1-Po)k-1
p(t=L+T)=Po(1 _P)L+T-1
Figure 4.4: Probability tree of earthquakes
Then, the total expected real and perceived benefits of the project can be computed as:
TTB
TB =
to= 1
T
PTB =
to= 1
B - p(t = to) +
tC
[PB - .p(t=t o) +
t=O t= 1 t=2 t=3 ...... t=n
1-Po
T+L
y [B- p (t = to)]
-=T+1
T+L
I [PB -p (t= to)
t = T+ 1
(4.5)
(4.6)
-0
where, p(t=to) is the probability that the first earthquake will strike in year to.
So, the Net Present Value of cost and benefit of the project is:
T
NPV = (P) TB - [ ( to - 1) A C p ( t = t0) + S K (4.7)
to =1 (1+i)
where, AC is the annual cost of the project,
(P)TB means using PTB or TB.
To get the optimal solution for a given project, the following programming problem
should be solved:
MAX (NPV)
T, X1
s.t. AC< Annual Budget
The above programming problem is a nonlinear programming problem (NLP). To solve it,
some simplifications should be made with it or we could calculate the NPV values by enu-
meration and then select the best one.
Similar calculation can be done for the optimal Benefit/Cost Ratio of the project if we use
Benefit/Cost Ratios criterion.
4.1.2 Multiple projects in a railway network
Now let us consider a construction program of a set of projects. Here, costs are functions
of the total construction activities in a given time period (because of constraints on equip-
ment, labor, etc.). We are to devise an optimal plan for the set of projects, where each
project can start at any time t, and be of some duration with some level of strengthening.
For example, a 4-project program can be depicted as in Figure 4.5:
Year t
Project 0 1 2 3 4
1
3
Figure 4.5: Time Diagram of a 4-project program
For each project we have three decision variables. First, we consider the degree of
strengthening that should take place (V/X1). Second, we consider the start date for the
project. Third, we consider the project duration. Our problem is to select these parameters
for each project in a multiple project set.
The different beginning times of different projects and the cost interaction among the mul-
tiple projects make the analyses more complicated than the single project case and we can-
not simply sum the results of the single project case as the multiple project case result. But
the basic idea of the modeling is similar to the single project case.
1. Cost analyses:
As mentioned in the above section, the interaction among the multiple projects compli-
cates the cost analysis. These are several factors to be considered here. First, each con-
struction project causes some disruption of service on the system (for example, train
delays). If multiple projects are proceeding simultaneously, one could argue that the dis-
ruptions would be greater collectively than the simple sum of the disruptions caused by
the projects individually.
Also, one can hypothesize that the construction costs accruing to JR East will be greater in
a circumstance where multiple projects are going on simultaneously because of limitations
in the construction capacity of the company. For example, performing a number of
projects at one time might require the railroad to rent additional construction equipment.
On the other hand, if the construction schedule did not have overlap in projects, the rail-
road would use only its own equipment at a lower overall construction cost. This situation
might require the railroad to hire additional, less efficient workers on a temporary basis
since their own work force may not have the capacity to perform a number of projects at
the same time.
So, we cannot simply give the variable cost function as we have done in the single project
case without associating with it a certain period of time t. What we do here is give the
annual cost function directly by using the idea of the cost function in the single project
case. The cost associated with the number of projects which are being constructed at the
same time period and the corresponding revenue loss are also included. Now, we can use
the following cost function to express the annual cost of year t:
AC (t) = ), -I1n k (n, t) + P2 k (n, t) k (n,t) +P 3 T( (4.8)
n=l In-n-I n=1
where, N is the total number of projects,
K(n) is the length of project n,
T(n) is construction time of project n,
k(n,t) is the length of tracks being constructed in year t of project n,
K , if project(n )0, if project n is being constructed at t,
0, if project n is not being constructed at t.
n(t) is the number of projects being constructed at year t.
In this function, the first term indicates the cost portion corresponding to the track
strengthening; the second term indicates the cost corresponding to the overall construction
rate. The third term indicates the cost corresponding to the number of the projects being
constructed at the same time due to the constraint of equipment and labor source and the
revenue loss (Here, we measure the monotonic relationship between annual cost and the
number of projects which are being constructed at the same time period using a square
root function). The fourth item adds the effects of the fixed cost and the corresponding
annual revenue loss caused by the construction of each project.
Similar to the single project case, the total cost (if all projects are finished) is:
T N N
TC = AC (t) " 1 + ij -ET(n) + L F (4.9)
t= 1 n= 1(1+i) n= 1
where, ET(n) is the ending construction time of project n,
T= max (ET(n)),
S is the average salvage value of one kilometer track,
CFn(t) is the fixed cost of project n which is begun at year t. Same as the
situation in single project, we assume CFn(t)=O for simplification.
2. Benefit analyses:
As in the single project case, the benefit is the reduction of the physical damages and the
reduction in fatalities and injuries of passengers. So the benefit associated with the multi-
ple projects case is the sum of the benefit of each project.
The maximum possible benefit (i.e., if the first earthquake strikes after all the projects) is
the sum of the possible benefits associated with all projects in the multiple-project pro-
gram. That is:
N
B = XB(n) (4.10)
n=l
where, B(n) is the total possible benefit of project n.
3. Benefit-cost comparison: An example
If we do not have any information about the plans for the multiple-project construction, all
the possible combinations of the beginning time and construction rate of the projects
should be considered. In this example, for simplicity, we can assume that all the projects in
the system should be constructed to a same safety level (h). Further, we assume that the
probability of a serious earthquake striking is the same everywhere in the JR East system.
Then we can determine the optimal beginning time and the construction rate combination
of all projects by calculating the NPV of benefits and costs of every possible combination.
For example, if we want to find the optimal beginning time and construction rate combina-
tion of the four-project case as shown in Figure 4.5, we can calculate the NPV of benefits
and costs of all the combinations. One combination of the four-project case can be shown
in table 4.1.
In this example, for a given safety improvement level X1, if we assume that everything
should be done within four years, then the total number of the possible combinations is:
(8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1)4=364= 1679616.
We can see that the number of possibilities in a real-world case can be very large, espe-
cially if the number of projects is large.
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4
T=[O, 0.5] 0 1 0 1
T=[0.5, 1.0] 0 1 0 1
T=[1.0, 1.5] 1 1 0 1
T=[1.5, 2.0] 1 1 0 1
T=[2.0, 2.5] 1 0 1 1
T=[2.5, 3.0] 1 0 1 0
T=[3.0, 3.5] 1 0 1 0
T=[3.5, 4.0] 0 0 1 0
Table 4.1: Alternative plan of multiple projects
In some situations, it is not necessary to consider all the possible plans for the multiple-
projects. What we can do is select an economical plan among several plans submitted by
experienced experts. Then, the following calculations should be done for each plan to
obtain the NPV values, we then choose the one with the largest NPV and with costs meet-
ing the budget constraint as the optimal plan.
If the first earthquakes strike during the projects, then the expected Net Present Value of
Benefits and costs is:
NPV = max { (t - BT (n)), } ak (n) B (n) p (n,t) - AC (t) (4.11)
t=Iln= 1
where, BT(n) is the beginning construction time of project n,
ET(n) is the ending construction time of project n,
ak(n)=T , is annual construction length of project n,
p(n, t) is the probability of the first earthquake strikes in the area of project n,
T=Max(ET(n)).
If the first earthquakes strike after all the projects, then the expected Net Present Value of
benefits and costs is:
T+L N
NPV 2 = [B(n) . p (n, t) + S.K(n) (4.12)t=T =1 (l ET (n)
So, the total expected NPV value of the N project is:
max NPV = NPV 1 + NPV2  (4.13)
s.t. TC <= budget
To select the optimal plan, what we should do is select the maximum NPV value com-
puted above with costs meeting the budget constraint to obtain the final optimal plan
among all the plans. Similar calculation can be done for the optimal Benefit/Cost Ratios of
the projects if we use Benefit/Cost Ratios criterion.
4. Numerical example of comparing alternative plans: Four-project case
Here, we use a simple four-project case example as illustration to show how to compare
the alternative multiple project plans in terms of NPV values.
General conditions:
1) Cost of track damage of one track failure: d= $600,000,
2) Cost of damage to a crashed train: DT= $50,000,
3) Value of a human life: V=$2,000,000 (by willingness-to-pay theory).
4) Useful lifetime of the all track strengthening project: tL=20 year,
5) Average train headways: Headway=25 km,
6) Average fatalities and injuries when a train crashes on surface lines at a speed of 50km/
hour: F=30, I=90 (F and I will vary with train crashing speed according to Eq. 3.5, 3.6),
7) Annual cost function for multiple track strengthening projects:
N 2 N N
AC(t) = 20000 1 (n,t) + 200 k ( n , t)  k (n, t) + 500r(t) (4.14)
n= n n=n=
Conditions of the four projects:
Prob. ofProject # Prob. length (km)Earthquake
1 0.01 0.2 40
2 0.005 0.2 30
3 0.005 0.2 25
4 0.005 0.2 25
Table 4.2: Condition of the four projects in the example.
Alternative project schedule plans:
Plan Project # X1 Starting T(yr.) ending T (yr.)
Plan #1 1 0.05 0 0.5
2 0.1 0 0.5
3 0.1 0 0.5
4 0.1 0 0.5
Plan #2 1 0.05 0 1
2 0.1 0 1
3 0.1 0 1
4 0.1 0 1
Plan #3 1 0.05 0 2
2 0.1 0 2
3 0.1 0 2
4 0.1 0 2
Plan #4 1 0.05 0 3
2 0.1 0 3
3 0.1 0 3
4 0.1 0 3
Plan #5 1 .. 05 0 4
2 0.1 0 4
3 0.1 0 4
4 0.1 0 4
Plan #6 1 0.05 0 1
2 0.1 1 2
3 0.1 2 3
4 0.1 3 4
Plan #7 1 0.05 0 0.5
2 0.1 0.5 1
3 0.1 1 1.5
4 0.1 1.5 2.0
Plan#8 1 0.05 0 1
2 0.1 0 1
3 0.1 1 2
4 0.1 1 2
Plan #9 1 0.05 0 2
2 0.1 0 2
3 0.1 2 4
4 0.1 2 4
Table 4.3: Nine alternative project schedule plans
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Figure 4.6: NPV values of the nine alternative plans
Figure 4.6 shows the NPV values of the nine alternative plans. In this example, according
to NPV value criterion, the best plan is Plan #6, which is proceeding the four projects one
by one and the duration of each of them is one year.
4.2 Viaduct retrofitting program design
As we have pointed out in Chapter 3, the lines on viaducts can also be considered as
homogeneous lines in terms of the uniform characteristics of existing viaduct columns and
this enables us to use a weighting factor w(s) to measure the failure rate of viaduct line,
Xv(s). Also since the cost structure of viaduct retrofitting program is very similar to that of
the track strengthening projects, we can use the same form of direct cost function here as
we used for track strengthening project program by giving a weighting factor for it. On the
other hand, since a train derailment accident on the viaducts will usually cause a train to
roll down from the viaducts, so it is more likely to be a severe derailment than a normal
derailment accident on the surface lines, that is, it will probably result in more fatalities
and injuries. Now we can use the same models that we presented in section 4.1 to design
the viaduct retrofitting program by using the failure rate Xv(s) instead of X(s) by making
some adjustments.
4.3 Risk-benefit analysis of early warning systems
As we have discussed in Chapter 3, the early warning system reduces the distance traveled
by trains on potentially damaged tracks and therefore reduces the risk of severe accidents
like derailments, which under seismic conditions occur mainly when a running train
encounters a damaged section of the track.
Here, it is assumed that the each early warning systems take effect independently of oth-
ers. That means we assume each location along the lines is served by exactly one warning
system. Hence, we will consider the effect of one early warning system when considering
a specified geographic area.
Unlike the track strengthening strategy which can reduce the track damage by the earth-
quakes, the only benefit of installing early warning system comes from not hitting a bro-
ken rail. To be more clearly stated, the early warning system could only reduce the
earthquake risks related to train derailment since people can do nothing to protect the rails
except stopping trains by emergency braking and reducing the probability of train derail-
ment when they are warned by the early warning system.
First, the emergency braking stop distance under warning timeTo can be calculated as:
22a(V0 - a. wT 0)Xw = 2a (4.15)
where Xw is the emergency braking stop distance with a warning system,
V0 is the average operating speed of trains,
wTo is the warning time of the early warning system served for the area,
a is the emergency deceleration rate.
From Equation 4.15, it is clear that different early warning system cause different emer-
gency braking distance for a certain kind of braking system. Recall that using Equation 3.4
the probability of train derailment can be calculated. Furthermore, the earthquake risks in
terms of the passenger fatalities and injuries, train damages with and without the early
warning system can be obtained by using Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. Then the benefit
associated with the early warning system can be calculated as (if using the real monetary
collective risk):
Bw = R2 (X) - R2 (X w) + WF - [E (F) - E (F) ] + W, - [E (I) - E (I)] (4.16)
where R2 (X,), Ew(F), Ew(I) and R2 (X), E(F), E(I) are earthquake risks in terms of
train damage, passenger fatalities, injuries with and without warning system,
respectively.
We assume that the cost of the warning systems are related to their maximum warning
time because of the different level of technology and system complexity associated with
them. For simplicity, we assume that when all warning systems are operated optimally,
that is no unnecessary train delays and cancellations are caused by the warning systems,
so the maximum warning time can be achieved. Also considering the basic equipment and
technology necessary for a warning system, we assume a nonlinear relationship between
the cost of a earthquake early warning system and its maximum warning time, as shown in
Equation 4.17:
C (wT0 ) =a + wT2 (4.17)
where wTo is the maximum early warning time of a system,
a and 13 are coefficients.
Comparing the benefit and certain cost for installing the early warning system, it is easy to
find which kind of warning system is most worthwhile from the investment point of view
by selecting the optimal NPV value(s) or B/C ratio(s).
4.4 Risk-benefit analysis of advanced braking systems
As we have also discussed in Chapter 3, the earthquake risks can be reduced if the braking
system is more advanced, since if the earthquake strikes, the risk for a train to encounter a
track failure can be reduced by decreasing the emergency braking stop distances.
The risk-benefit analysis for the strategy of installing advance braking system is similar to
that for constructing early warning system. the difference is only that instead of using
Equation 4.15 to calculate the emergency stop distance under a warning time wTO, the
emergency stop distance by changing the braking system can be calculated by the follow-
ing equation:
2
(V0)X- 2a
(4.18)
where a is the is the deceleration rate of the braking system.
Also by using Equations 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, the earthquake risks in terms of passenger
fatalities and injuries, train damages with and without changing to an advanced emergency
braking system can be calculated. Then the benefit associated with the advanced braking
system can be calculated as (if using the real monetary collective risk):
Bb = R2 (X) - R2 (Xb) + WF-. [E(F) - Eb (F) ] + WI - [E (I) - Eb (I)]
where R2(Xb), Eb(F), Eb(I) and R2(X), E(F), E(I) are earthquake risks in terms of
train damages, passenger fatality, injury with and without changing to an
advanced braking system, respectively.
We assume that the cost of the braking systems are related to their minimum stop distance
because of the different level of technology. Similar to early warning systems, we assume
a nonlinear relationship between the cost of brakes for one car and the reduction of emer-
gency braking stop distance considering the necessities of the basic technology and equip-
ment for a early warning system. The more advanced warning systems are often achieved
by updating the previous warning system with shorter warning time. On the other hand, it
will cost much more when reducing the braking distance for one more unit from the more
advanced level than that from the relatively lower level, so we assume a cost function of
square form for the braking systems:
C (X) = cc~ (X 0 -X) 2 + (4.20)
where C(X) is the investment for replacing a braking system with minimum stop
distance X0 with that of X for one car,
a and 03 are the coefficients.
By comparing the benefit and certain cost for installing the advanced emergency system, it
is easy to find which kind of braking system is most worthwhile from the investment point
of view by selecting the optimal NPV value(s) or B/C ratio(s).
4.5 A safety management plan for allocation of safety
investment among the safety counter-measures
A safety management plan is an action-oriented decision aid based on risk assessment
techniques. It focuses on the optimal allocation of resources and aims at ensuring achiev-
ing maximum safety for the money spent. The purpose of the risk assessment analysis is to
(4.19)
develop a safety management plan.
So after presenting the methods for finding the optimal investment for individual safety
counter-measures in terms of getting the largest benefit-cost ratios, we need next to com-
pare these alternative earthquake safety counter-measures and determine the optimal way
of allocating the resources among them.
A potential problem when we try to compare two safety counter-measures or plans is the
following: Should we regard the best safety plan only according to the benefit-cost ratios
or should we try to use the resource as much as possible to improve the safety? For exam-
ple, say A and B as shown in Figure 4.6 are two safety plans composed of the individual
safety counter-measures such as track strengthening, installing warning systems, and
improving braking systems, etc. or their combinations. The benefit-cost ratio of Plan A is
better than that of Plan B, but the total risk reduction of Plan B is larger than Plan A.
Should we choose A or B?
Risk Reduction
Base risk level
Investment (cost)
Budget
Figure 4.7: Risk Reduction vs. budget.
To answer this problem, we can view it from the point of the company's head who need to
consider all the investment problems for the company in addition to safety investment. He
also needs to consider the optimal allocation among safety investment and other invest-
ment such as adding new trains, recruiting more employees, etc. So at least theoretically,
when we consider the optimal allocation among the safety counter-measures, we can
1
always try to find the optimal allocations under hypothetical budget scenarios and then
determine the optimal level of investment (if it exists) according to the discussion of Sec-
tion 2.3.2.
Then we can focus on the allocation problem under different budget scenarios. In the case
of our earthquake safety improvement problem, since there are interactive relationships
between the counter-measures (For example, Section 4.3 shows that the risk reduction of a
early warning system B, is a function of not only its early warning time wT o but also the
deceleration rate of the emergency braking systems a as well as the track failure rate X1
which is determined by track strengthening projects, section 3.4 shows similar interactive
relationships), Under a certain budget, we should consider all possible safety plans (here,
we use the word "plan" which means single strategy or the combination of strategies, such
as track strengthening, installing warning systems, and improving braking systems etc., or
their combinations), we cannot easily add up the optimal risk reductions of two strategies
as the total optimal risk reduction of the two strategies. That means, under a certain invest-
ment level, we should consider all possible safety plans (here, we use the word "plan"
which means individual counter-measures or the possible combination of more than one
counter-measures). This adds complexity to this problem. We can see the application in
the case studies in the next chapter.
Also, when we consider the allocation problem under a certain investment budget, the
decisions are affected by the way how the company perceives the risk (i.e., use different
risk measures). As we stated in 2.2.2, different risk measures refer to the fact that an acci-
dent is perceived to be different compared to its direct consequences. So if we perceive the
risk using different risk measures (i.e., different risk conversion factors), the results of the
optimal allocation problem may be very different. This is shown in the sensitivity analyses
in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Case Studies
In this section, we use two simple examples as illustrations of the principles discussed ear-
lier in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. This is a very simple situation for analyzing resource allo-
cation to improve safety; our intension is to show how the models and principles work.
5.1 Case study I: Surface line
Suppose there is a small passenger railroad company which has a very simple railroad net-
work. In the network, there are two stations connected by a homogeneous single line (with
sidings). The line is 50 km long. The company has a fleet with 4 trains (each with 15 cars
and a locomotive). The average operating speed of the trains is 50 km/hour. One train is
sent every hour in each direction which means there are always 2 trains running on the
line. Assume that no early warning systems are currently available in the railroad network.
Track Failures (k)
V0 V0
Figure 5.1: Simple homogeneous line in Case Study I.
In this case, three safety counter-measures are employed to improve the earthquake safety:
track strengthening, installing warning systems, and improving the braking systems.
i
As stated in Chapter 4, to find the optimal investment plan which is the main purpose of
risk assessment, we need always consider the available safety investment budgets First,
we can show the results of cost-benefit analyses for individual safety counter-measures.
Then, we will see how the safety investment should be allocated among these safety
counter-measures in the optimal way under different budget scenarios. Different risk mea-
sures (associated with different risk conversion power factor a in Equation 2.3) are used
here to evaluate the real and perceived risk which may affect how we allocate resources
among the counter-measures.
The numerical assumptions related to this case study are following:
1) The probability of earthquake: P0=0.005 /year (once per 200 years), for sensitivity
analyses (presented in Appendix B), we also consider Po=0.01/year, Po=0.02/year and
Po=0.05/year.
2) Failure rate of the current condition tracks in case of earthquake: =-0.2(failures/km),
3) The minimum track failure rate achievable through strengthening:
X•=0.05(failures/km),
4) Average train operating speed: Vo=50 km/hour, for sensitivity analyses (presented in
Appendix B), we also consider Vo=40 km/hour, Vo=60 km/hour and Vo=70 km/hour.
5) Useful lifetime of the track strengthening project: tL=20 year,
6) Cost of track damage of one track failure: d=$60,000,
7) Cost of damage to a crashed train: DT=$50,000,
8) Value of a human life: V=$2,000,000,
9) Current emergency braking stop distance is 1.0 km,
10) Useful lifetime of the braking systems: bL=10 year,
11) The minimum braking stop distance of all braking systems for conventional trains
(with operation speed of 50km/hour as assumed): X=0.4 km,
12) Useful lifetime of the warning systems: wL=10 year,
13) The early warning time of all early warning systems is up to: wT 0 =30 second,
14) Risk conversion power factors for calculating real and perceived risks:
a=1.0, a=1.5, a=2.0,
15) Average fatality and injury numbers when a train crashes on surface lines at a speed
of 50km/hour: F=30, I=90 (F and I will vary with train crashing speed according to
Equation 3.5 and 3.6,
16) Direct construction cost function for track strengthening projects:
S= 20000 -)2(fT, (1 Ti + 2000 K100T (5.1)
for sensitivity analyses (presented in Appendix B), we also consider the cost functions:
S K '- ) = 30000( 1)2
=i, Xo10000x-1)2
3000 (high construction costs)+3000 OT
1000 IfK (low construction costs)
+ 1000
17) Cost function of warning systems:
2 (5.4)
C (wTo) = 8000 + 20. To
for sensitivity analyses (presented in Appendix B), we also consider the cost functions:
2
C (wT) = 12000 + 30TO (high cost warning system) (5.5)
2C (wT0) = 4000 + lOTo (low cost warning system) (5.6)
18) Cost function of braking systems:
C (XO- X) = 1200. (Xo - X)2+ 160 (5.7)
for sensitivity analyses (presented in Appendix B), we also consider the cost functions:
C(X o- X) = 1800- (Xo - X)2 +240 (high cost braking system)
2C (X o - X) = 600. (X o - X) + 80 (low cost braking system)
Here, Equation 5.1, 5.4, and 5.7 represent the medium cost level for track strengthening,
warning systems, and braking systems, respectively. Equation 5.2, 5.5, and 5.8 represent
the high cost level. Equation 5.3, 5.6, and 5.9 represent the low cost level.
(5.2)
(5.3)
(5.8)
(5.9)
5.1.1 Risk-benefit analyses for the earthquake safety counter-measures
If we assume that the three safety counter-measures are implemented individually, then
under any investment level, we can find the optimal solution for each of the counter-mea-
sures by calculating the B/C Ratios. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 shows an example of the
results by real risk measure (a= 1.0).
Track Warning BrakingTL Cost ($K)
strengthening systems systems
10 -- 9.14 7.55
20 -- 8.78 6.37
30 -- -- 5.18
40 4.32 -- --
50 4.07 -- --
60 3.82 -- --
70 3.60 -- --
80 3.39 -- --
90 3.21 -- --
100 3.05 -- --
Table 5.1: Summary of B/C Ratios of the three safety counter-measures
(Real risk: a=1.0)
TL Cost ($K) T(yr.) 1 wT(sec.) X(km)
10 -- -- 10 0.9
20 -- -- 25 0.6
30 -- -- -- 0.4
40 3.0 0.16 -- --
50 2.5 0.15 -- --
60 2.5 0.14 -- --
70 2.0 0.14 -- --
80 2.0 0.13 -- --
90 1.5 0.13 -- --
100 1.5 0.12 -- --
Table 5.2: Implement of the three safety counter-measures (Real risk: a=1.0)
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From Table 5.1, we can see clearly that the three safety counter-measures have different
cost characteristics. When the budget is tight, the track strengthening project cannot be
performed because of its high set-up costs. The counter-measures of installing warning
systems and improving braking systems, on the other hand, do not need as much invest-
ment. But when the budget is not very tight, for example, $50K, installing warning sys-
tems and improving braking systems cannot provide further safety improvement due to
the assumed technology limit (i.e., we assume the braking distance cannot be less than
0.4km and the early warning time can not be longer than 30 seconds in this example).
5.1.2 Safety investment allocation among the safety counter-measures
As we stated earlier, the main purpose of risk assessment is to make investment decisions.
Now, we try to use this example and show how to allocate the safety investment among
the different counter-measures.
We have made the risk-benefit analyses for the three single safety counter-measure indi-
vidually in Section 5.1.1. Since there are interactive relationships among these earthquake
safety counter-measures, we can not simply sum up the optimal benefits and costs of the
three counter-measures as the optimal benefit and cost of the combination safety plan of
these three counter-measures.
It is much easier when we consider investment for, say, level crossing safety and track
strengthening projects, since the investment in level crossing safety has nothing to do with
the earthquake safety improvement except the budget constraint. So we can just consider
these two independent safety investments in the following way: First, carry out the bene-
fit-cost analyses for these two safety counter-measures separately, then balance the budget
between them to get the optimal investment allocation (in the case of optimal allocation,
the B/C Ratios for the two investments should be equivalent).
However, in this case, the situation is more complicated. Because of the interactive rela-
tionship among these earthquake safety counter-measures which we mentioned many
times in the previous chapters, the optimal investment for one of the counter-measures is
also a function of the optimal investment for other counter-measures.
So for comprehensive analysis and comparisons, all the possible options have to be con-
sidered. For the case stated above, there are seven safety options in total for consideration:
1. Track strengthening projects,
2. Warning systems,
3. Braking systems,
4. Track strengthening +Warning systems,
5. Track strengthening + Braking systems,
6. Braking systems + Warning systems,
7. Track strengthening +Warning systems + Braking systems.
The strategy for finding the optimal investment allocation is as follows: Under a certain
investment level, we can first consider all possible allocation alternatives among the safety
counter-measures and get the optimal plan with the biggest B/C value for each option,
then compare the seven optimal plans and choose the best one as the final optimal solution
for this investment level.
The optimal investment allocation to the safety options under various budgets are summa-
rized in Tables 5.3 for real risk measure (a= 1.0). In Section 2.3.2, we have discussed that
we can get the optimal level of safety investment when the marginal risk reduction by per
unit of investment equal to -1 (approximately, we can use ATB=ATC to get the optimal
investment level). In this case, the optimal level investment is $130K.
Similarly, results based on two different risk measures (associated with two different con-
version power factors a=1.5 and a=2.0) of perceived risk are summarized in Tables 5.4
and 5.5. When a= 1.5, the optimal investment level is $340K, while when a=2.0, the theo-
retical optimal investment level can not be achieved due to the assumed technology
restriction. In this situation we regard the biggest possible investment level as the optimal
investment level, say, in this case, it is $340K.
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 shows the optimal real and perceived risk reduction under different
budget scenarios based on different risk measures. From the figure, it is clear that the
when the risk levels becomes lower, the marginal investment for one unit of risk reduction
become larger.
Risk
TL Cost 1 2 3 B/CRiskTL Cost Cs1  Cb Cw Option Reduction($K) Ratio ($K)($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 9.14 91.3
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 8.78 175.6
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 7.29 218.8
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 5.78 231.3
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 5.20 260.0
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 4.76 285.5
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 4.38 306.4
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 4.05 323.7
90 72.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.76 338.4
100 74.0 13.5 12.5 7 3.52 352.0
110 82.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.31 364.4
120 92.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.13 375.3
130 102.0 15.5 12.5 7 2.96 385.1
140 112.0 15.5 12.5 7 2.81 393.9
150 122.0 15.5 12.5 7 2.68 402.0
Table 5.3: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for surface lines under
various budgets (Real risk: a=1.0)
1. Budget allocated
2. Budget allocated
3. Budget allocated
to track strengthening,
to installing advanced braking systems,
to setting up early warning systems.
RiskTL Cost Cs' Cb2  Cw 3  Options B/C Ratio Reduction
($K)($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 57.66 576
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 53.12 1062
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 41.88 1256
40 0.0 23.5 16.5 6 32.62 1304
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 29.60 1479
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 26.80 1607
70 54.5 15.5 0.0 5 24.44 1710
80 64.5 15.5 0.0 5 22.43 1794
90 72.2 17.8 0.0 5 20.78 1869
100 74.0 13.5 12.5 7 19.07 1907
110 84.0 13.5 12.5 7 17.87 1965
120 94.0 13.5 12.5 7 16.81 2017
330 305.6 11.9 12.5 7 7.65 2526
340 315.6 11.9 12.5 7 7.46 2536
Table 5.4: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for surface lines under
various budgets (Perceived risk: (x=1.5)
1. Budget allocated
2. Budget allocated
3. Budget allocated
to track strengthening,
to installing advanced braking systems,
to setting up early warning systems.
Risk
TLCost Cs1  Cb2  Cw 3  Options B/C Ratio Reduction($K)($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 362.0 3620.2
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 320.7 6413.9
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 241.7 7250.5
40 0.0 23.5 16.5 6 186.2 7449.0
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 167.3 8363.1
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 150.8 9051.9
70 54.5 15.5 0.0 5 137.0 9591.2
80 64.5 15.5 0.0 5 125.5 10039.6
90 74.5 15.5 0.0 5 116.1 10444.6
100 74.5 13.5 12.5 7 108.2 10818.6
340 315.6 11.9 12.5 7 7.46 2536
Table 5.5: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for surface lines under
various budgets (Perceived risk: ox=2.0)
1. Budget allocated to track strengthening,
2. Budget allocated to installing advanced braking systems,
3. Budget allocated to setting up early warning systems.
As assumed and illustrated, the results of Case Study I show that under different budget
scenarios, the optimal safety options are usually different. When the budget is small, say,
$10K or $20K, choosing a single inexpensive safety counter-measure such as installing
advanced braking systems is the most cost-efficient way to invest. But when the budget
becomes larger and larger, then more than one safety counter-measures can be invested at
the same time.
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Figure 5.2: Optimal investment level and optimal risk reduction under different
budget scenarios by real risk measure (a=1.0)
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Figure 5.3: Optimal investment level and optimal risk reduction under different
budget scenarios by perceived risk measure (cx=2.0)
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The reason is that as shown in Table 5.1, the safety counter-measures such as installing
advanced braking systems and warning systems are more cost efficient compared to track
strengthening projects under lower investment levels. On the other hand, the benefits of
these two counter-measures are limited by the technology and physical constraint since for
example, we can never stop the train within zero time or within zero stop distance by any
braking systems. Under this consideration for the parameters selected, if there is extra
money available, we also need to invest in track strengthening projects and allocate the
investment among these three safety counter-measures. For this system, the case study
shows such optimal allocations when the budget is greater than $20K.
One thing should be noted here is that when we use different risk measures (conversion
factors) to calculate the real and perceived risk reduction, 1) The optimal level of invest-
ment are very different, which is closely related to the different magnitudes of B/C Ratios.
2) Optimal options may change for the same investment level.
However, there are only slight differences on the investment allocation among these safety
counter-measures. For example, under the budget of $80K, the optimal safety investment
option for both real risk measure (xa=1.0) and perceived risk measures (a=1.5 and a=2.0)
is option 5, which is the combination of the counter-measures of track strengthening and
improving the braking systems. For a=1.0, the investment allocations among these two
safety counter-measures are $62.2K, and $17.8K, respectively. On the other hand, with a
equal to 1.5, the allocations among them are $64.5K, and $15.5K, respectively.
Why are not these changes very significant? The answer is that all these safety counter-
measures are intended to reduce the earthquake risk. That means, although these safety
measures can reduce earthquake risk in different ways, either by reducing the conse-
quences or by reducing the probabilities of derailment accidents, or both, the category of
the accidents involved with the benefit-cost analyses of these earthquake counter-mea-
sures is the same, which is the catastrophic train derailment accidents caused by earth-
quakes. In this situation, the effects of the risk conversion power factors (which reflects
the way how the public and transportation companies perceive the risk) on the risk reduc-
tions by the different counter-measures are not significantly different.
But if we consider resource allocation between the earthquake counter-measures and the
safety counter-measures for improving level-crossing safety, the situation will be much
different. As we described in Section 2.3.2, the marginal-cost-criterion for solving the
allocation optimization problem allocates resources in such a way that the marginal cost
for risk reduction is equal for all subsystems. Although level crossing accidents are rela-
tively frequent, they normally have very few fatalities in each accident. The effects of the
conversion factors (a) on the level crossing safety investment and earthquake safety
investment are very different, and this can dramatically affect the B/C Ratios of these two
different categories of investment. Therefore, the allocation between the investment on
earthquake safety and level crossing safety will be very different under different assump-
tion of risk conversion power factors. The larger the risk conversion power factor we use,
the larger portion of budget will be used for improving earthquake safety.
Even the investment allocations under different measures for risk (or perceived risk) are
slightly different, as shown in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, in each case, the Benefit/Cost Ratios
decreases when the investment level increases. This means that an additional risk reduc-
tion by one unit of safety investment decreases when the risk level of the system
decreases.
Now, we perform sensitivity analysis. If we change the earthquake probabilities, train
operation speed and the cost functions of the three earthquake safety counter-measures,
what will happen to the optimal investment levels and allocation? Appendix B shows the
detailed results. Figure 5.4-5.6 can provide a good sense of the change of optimal invest-
ment levels with respect to the change of earthquake probabilities, train operation speed
and cost structures of the three counter-measures.
From Figure 5.4 shows that the optimal investment levels change with respect to the
change of earthquake probabilities (other conditions remain unchanged) in the project
area. The higher the earthquake probabilities are, the higher the investment level is needed
to achieve the optimal. This is very intuitive; higher earthquake probabilities mean higher
earthquake risk, therefore, more safety investment is needed.
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity analysis: optimal investment levels vs. earthquake
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Similarly, Figure 5.5 shows that the optimal investment levels change with respect to the
change of train operation speed (other conditions remain unchanged), the higher the train
operation speed is, the higher the investment level is needed to achieve the optimal.
Figure 5.6 shows the change of optimal investment levels with respect to the change of
magnitude of cost functions of the three counter-measures.The change in this case is not
very significant. We can explain this phenomena as that the optimal investment levels are
affected by two factors which are different directions. One of them is that lower cost levels
the counter-measures have, the more "productive" they can be in terms of safety improve-
ment (higher B/C Ratios), so the optimal investment level should be higher (like the situa-
tions by real risk measure and perceived risk measures). But on the other hand, the lower
cost levels the counter-measures have, the less safety investment are needed since the
safety improvement is easier to achieve in this situation. This two factors determine that
the optimal investment levels of the plans with different cost function combinations do not
change very significantly.
5.2 Case Study II: Viaduct line
In this section, we use the same railroad network example as we used in Case Study I. All
other conditions are the same except that we assume the 50 km lines are all viaducts lines.
Figure 5.7 is an illustration of this simple heterogenous lines. We still assume that no early
warning systems are currently available in the railroad network.
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Figure 5.7: Viaduct line in Case Study II.
In this case, three safety counter-measures can be employed to improve the earthquake
safety, which are retrofitting the rail viaducts, installing warning systems, and improving
the braking systems.
Similar to Case Study I, we have to consider all the safety counter-measures and their
combinations. The options are below:
1. Viaduct retrofitting only,
2. Installing warning systems only,
3. Improving braking systems only,
4. Viaduct retrofitting+Warning systems,
5. Viaduct retrofitting +Braking systems,
6. Warning systems +Braking systems,
7. Viaduct retrofitting+Warning systems+Braking systems.
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, a weighting factor w(s) can be used to measure the failure
rate of viaduct lines, kv(s), which is given in Equation 3.2. Also according to the assump-
tions that the form of direct cost function of retrofitting viaduct projects is the same as that
of track strengthening projects except that higher costs are involved with viaduct retrofit-
ting projects.
Now, we can analyze this case study by using the same other numerical assumptions used
in Case Study I except the following:
1) Current failure rate of viaduct lines in case of earthquake: XA=1.5*X=0.3 (failures/km),
2) Average fatality and injury numbers when a train crashes on viaducts at a speed of
50km/hour: F=50, 1=150 (F and I will vary with train crashing speed according to
Equation 3.5 and 3.6,
3) Direct construction cost function for viaduct retrofitting projects:
C (K 40000 1 + 4000
ST' OOT (5.10)VI) V1 (5.10)
By carrying out the similar benefit-cost analyses in Case Study I and also, considering dif-
ferent risk measures (associated with different risk conversion power factor a in Equation
2.3) for real and perceived risk calculation, the optimal safety options and the optimal
investment allocations to the safety options under various budgets are summarized in
Table 5.6 for real risk measure (a=1.0), here, the optimal level of investment is $350K.
Similarly, the results based on two different risk measures (associated with different con-
version power factors a=1.5 and a=2.0) of perceived risk are summarized in Tables 5.7-
5.8, here, the optimal investment levels are all much beyond the optimal investment level
by real risk measure, $350K.
RiskTL Cost Cs' Cb2  Cw3  Option B/C Ratio Reduction
($K)($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 32.7 327
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 31.6 632
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 26.4 791
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 20.9 838
50 0.0 30.8 19.2 6 17.1 855
60 0.0 34.9 25.1 6 14.3 861
70 44.0 13.5 12.5 7 12.5 874
80 54.0 13.5 12.5 7 11.5 921
90 64.0 13.5 12.5 7 10.9 977
100 74.0 13.5 12.5 7 10.2 1024
...... .....
340 303.5 20.5 16.0 7 4.36 1482
350 313.5 20.5 16.0 7 4.26 1492
Table 5.6: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for viaduct line under
various budgets (Real risk: a=1.0)
Budget allocated to track strengthening,
Budget allocated to installing advanced braking systems,
Budget allocated to setting un early warning systemsvr
TL Cost Cs 1  Cb2  Cw3  Option B/C Risk
($K) Ratio Reduc. ($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 267 2670
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 248 4952
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 196 5879
40 0.0 20.5 19.5 6 153 6113
50 40.8 9.2 0.0 5 127 6373
60 50.8 9.2 0.0 5 115 6889
70 60.8 9.2 0.0 5 104 7268
80 70.8 9.2 0.0 5 95 7579
90 80.8 9.2 0.0 5 87 7846
100 90.8 9.2 0.0 5 81 8073
790 762.0 15.5 12.5 
7 15 11993..... ....
762.0 15.5 12.5 7 15 11993
Table 5.7: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for
various budgets (Perceived risk: a=1.5)
viaduct line under
TL Cs 1  Cb2  Cw3  Option B/C Risk Reduc.
Cost (K) s Ratio ($K)
10 0.0 0.0 i0.0 2 2171 21710
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 1932 38647
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 1461 43830
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 1126 45074
50 40.8 9.2 0.0 5 928 46380
60 50.8 9.2 0.0 5 836 51155
70 60.8 9.2 0.0 5 756 52930
80 70.8 9.2 0.0 5 690 55206
90 80.8 9.2 0.0 5 635 57158
100 90.8 9.2 0.0 5 588 58822
...... ......
790 764.0 13.5 12.5 7 111 87433
Table 5.8: Optimal investment allocation of the safety options for viaduct line under
various budgets (Perceived risk: a=2.0)
1. Budget allocated to track strengthening,
2. Budget allocated to installing advanced braking systems,
3. Budget allocated to setting up early warning systems.
The results of Case study II also show that under different budgets, the optimal safety
strategies are usually different. Also if we use different risk measures (i.e., different con-
version factor 0) to calculate the perceived risk reduction, the optimal investment levels
are very different (in this case, the optimal investment levels for perceived risk are also not
the theoretical optimal but the biggest possible investment levels). The optimal allocation
options also change under the same budget scenarios. For example, under the budget of
$70K-$100K, the optimal safety option for investment is Option 7 under real risk, but is
Option 5 under perceived risks. An additional risk reduction by one unit of safety invest-
ment decreases when the risk level of the system decreases. In other words, when the risk
level becomes lower, the marginal investment for one unit of risk reduction become larger.
In this chapter, we use two case studies to explain the models and principles presented in
the previous chapters. The next chapter will provide summaries and conclusions of the
entire thesis.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary and conclusions
The task of this thesis is to provide JR East with a framework to develop a safety manage-
ment plan for reducing earthquake risk and to illustrate its use. In this thesis, we employ
risk assessment methodology to assess the earthquake risk to the railroad and discuss the
principle of optimally allocating the safety investment among the alternative safety
counter-measures considered by JR East. This research also has its limits. The conclusions
are based on the data which are not real data but represent reasonable approximations.
Numerical sensitivity studies are performed to bracket the results.
First, various literatures in the field of risk assessment and previous work finished by the
JR East/MIT program are reviewed. The important concepts of the risk assessment meth-
odology are introduced, which include the notation of risk, steps of implementing the risk
assessment technique, and the safety management plan.
Then, we present the models to assess the earthquake risk to the railroad facilities and pas-
sengers. The earthquake related risk to the railroad are of two major kinds: (i) physical
damages to the railroad infrastructure and equipments such as viaduct and track failures,
train damages, etc. and (ii) passenger fatalities and injuries caused by train derailment
accidents when the running trains hit the track failures caused by earthquakes. By making
an assumption that the track (viaduct) failures during earthquakes follow a homogenous
spatial Poisson distribution, we can use probabilistic models to estimate both kinds of risk.
The monetary collective risks (both by real risk measure (a=l) according to SPI and per-
ceived risk measure (a>1)according to PSPI) are obtained by combining these two kinds
of risk.
After developing the models to assess the earthquake risks, we evaluate various safety
measures which can be implemented to reduce the earthquake risks. Four counter-mea-
sures considered by JR East are: strengthening the tracks, retrofitting the rail viaducts,
installing early warning systems, and improving braking systems.
Each of these counter-measures has its advantages and disadvantages. For example, the
track strengthening and viaduct retrofitting can improve the overall safety condition of the
rail lines. They will bring benefits for reducing risks not only of earthquakes but also of
other natural disasters, such as rainfall and landslides. But they are high investment
projects and can affect traffic operations, such as reduction of traffic volume and cause
revenue loss when the projects are in process.
Since the cost structures of these safety counter-measures are complex, we carry out the
benefit-cost analysis for each of them and try to find the optimal investment strategy in
terms of cost efficiency (measured by the Benefit/Cost ratios) for each of the counter-mea-
sures. Due to the consideration of limited construction resources, the costs of track
strengthening and viaduct retrofitting projects are not only related to their safety improve-
ment but also related to the processing rates of the projects and number of projects which
are processed at the same time. Therefore, the cost structures of these two counter-mea-
sures are complicated, especially when there is more than one project being processed at
the same time. This study takes initial steps on developing a framework by using a risk-
benefit analysis approach to determine how fast a set of construction projects for track
strengthening or viaduct retrofitting should be completed and the degree of strengthening
that is appropriate.
As for the braking systems and warning systems, the costs are only related to the mini-
mum stopping distances (deceleration rates) and maximum early warning time they can
provide, respectively, implying a more straightforward analysis structure.
Finally, since the purpose of the risk assessment analysis is to get a safety management
plan which focuses on the optimal allocation of resources and ensures obtaining maximum
safety for the money spent, we need to determine how to allocate the safety investment
among these four safety counter-measures optimally. In the real world, the resources are
always limited, so we develop methods which can work under different investment levels.
Also, because there are interactive relationships among these safety counter-measures, we
need to consider all the possible safety options (For a situation with three safety counter-
measures, there are seven safety options in total). Carrying out the cost-benefit analysis for
each of the options under each budget limitation, we can get the optimal plan for each
option based on the B/C Ratios and select the one with the biggest B/C Ratio as the final
optimal plan under such budget limits.
We use two case studies to show how the models work. The sensitivity analyses for earth-
quake probabilities, train operating speeds, and costs are shown in Appendix B.
Based on the selected data and parameters which we think are reasonable, the conclusions
from the case studies and sensitivity analyses are that the optimal strategies for allocating
safety investment among the various safety counter-measures are different under different
investment levels. When the budget is smaller, the best strategies and the optimal invest-
ment levels are usually inexpensive single safety counter-measures such as installing
warning systems. When the budget is larger, the optimal strategies are more likely to be
the combinations of some counter-measures.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5.4-5.6 and Appendix B, the optimal investment levels as
well as the optimal strategies under each investment level will change with the earthquake
probabilities, train operation speed and the unit costs of the counter-measures. Remaining
other situations the same, the optimal investment levels will increase as the earthquake
probability increases. Similarly, the optimal investment levels will also increase as the
train operation speed increases. And for both cases, the allocation among the counter-mea-
sures usually does not change significantly under each investment level. Oppositely, with
respect to the unit costs of the counter-measures, the optimal investment level does not
change very significantly, however, the investment allocation among the counter-measures
under each investment level is sensitive to the change of the unit costs. This is just as
expected: on one hand, for example, the cheaper counter-measure(s) are more likely to be
used, but on the other hand, because of the lower unit cost, the total investments needed
for the cheaper counter-measures will not be very high. These two different direction
effects cause the sensitive relationship between the unit costs of the counter-measures and
the investment allocation among them under the same investment levels. The change of
investment allocations depends on which of the two direction effects is more significant.
Another observation that stands out from the case studies is that when we use different
risk measures (different a) to calculate the monetary collective risks, the optimal strategy
and the allocations among the counter-measures under each investment level may change.
However, for the parameter selected, the change is also not very dramatic.
The reason why the investment allocations do not change significantly under the same
investment levels (except by different unit cost combinations) is that all the earthquake
safety counter-measures reduce the earthquake risk. Even though they reduce the earth-
quake risk in different ways, the category of the accidents involved with the benefit-cost
analyses is the same, which is the catastrophic train derailment accidents caused by earth-
quakes. In this situation, the effect of the earthquake probabilities, train operation speed,
and the risk conversion power factors (which reflects the way that the public and transpor-
tation companies perceive the risk) on the risk reduction by the different counter-measures
are not significantly different although risk measure (a) does affect optimal investment
level.
On the other hand, if we look at the resource allocation between the earthquake counter-
measures and the safety counter-measures for improving level-crossing safety, the situa-
tion we would expect to be significantly different. Since solving the allocation optimiza-
tion problem requires allocating resources in such a way that the marginal cost for risk
reduction is equal for all subsystems, and the level crossing accidents normally involve
very few passenger fatalities, the effects of the conversion factors on the level crossing
safety investment and earthquake safety investment are very different. This can dramati-
cally affect the B/C Ratios of these two categories of investment. So, the allocation
between the investment on earthquake safety and level crossing safety will be very differ-
ent under different risk measures (different risk conversion power factors). The larger the
risk conversion power factor we use, the larger portion of the whole budget will be used
for improving earthquake safety
Another importation conclusion is that as the risk level becomes smaller and smaller, it is
more and more difficult to improve safety since we need to invest more for one unit of
additional risk reduction.
6.2 Future Works and recommendation to JR East
1. Data refinement
The case studies in the thesis employed hypothetical but, we think, reasonable numbers.
We need to refine them by using the real world data get more realistic and more meaning-
ful results. Some of the data such as train operating speeds, current emergency braking
distances, are easy to get while others like earthquake probabilities in the project areas and
track failures rates and construction costs for multiple simultaneous projects are not very
easy.
The most difficult part of task for getting these data is to get precise empirical direct cost
function for track strengthening and viaduct retrofitting projects. To get data for a certain
area of JR East, we may need to consult the Japanese construction engineers. Also a better
way for getting the costs of different type of warning systems and braking systems is to
estimate the costs of the alternative systems one by one instead of using continuous func-
tions as we used in the case study for simplification. If JR East has a complete database for
these aspects we mentioned above, it will be very helpful to get the safety management
plan for reducing earthquake risks.
2. Employ the methods for complex networks
We have carried out the benefit-cost analysis and investment allocation methods to a very
simple railway network (two station and single line). This is suitable for a small regional
analysis. But, to develop an earthquake safety management for a big railway network like
JR East, it would be useful to employ the model to a more complex network. To achieve
this, more complicated analysis need to be carried out because of the interactive relation-
ships among the multi-projects of track strengthening (as well as the viaduct retrofitting
multi-projects). In Section 4.1.2, we have shown some benefit-cost analysis for the multi-
ple track strengthening projects. The analysis is preliminary, more study need to be done
for more complex railway network.
In the thesis, we presented the models developed for assessing earthquake risk and
improving earthquake safety through investment for railroads. We hope this will be help-
ful for the decision making of JR East in safety improvement and for other rail system
researches.
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Appendix A
Flow Charts of Computer Programs for Case Study I
This appendix provides the flow chart of computer program for each of the seven safety
improvement options in Case Study I. The computer programs can calculate the optimal
investment allocations among the earthquake counter-measures (track strengthening, early
warning systems, and braking systems) under alternative budget scenarios.
1. Flow chart for optioionl-Track strengthening program design
Figure A.1: Flow chart of track strengthening project design
2. Flow chart for option 2-Benefit-cost analysis for warning systems:
Figure A.2: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis warning systems
2. Flow chart for option 3-Benefit-cost analysis for braking systems:
Figure A.3: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis backing systems
4. Flow chart for option 4-benefit-cost analyses of warning systems
+track strengthening project:
Figure A.4: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis installing warning systems+track
strengthening project design
5. Flow chart for option 5-benefit-cost analyses of braking systems
+track strengthening project design:
Figure A.5: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis improving braking systems+track
strengthening project design
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6. Flow chart for option 6-benefit-cost analyses of braking systems
+warning systems:
Figure A.6: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis improving braking systems+installing
warning systems
7. Flow chart for option 7-benefit-cost analyses of braking systems
+warning systems +track strengthening project design:
Figure A.7: Flow chart of benefit-cost analysis improving braking systems+installing
warning systems+track strengthening project design
Appendix B
Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Investment Allocation in
Case Study I (Real Risk:o=1.0)
This appendix provides the sensitivity analyses of optimal investment allocations by
earthquake probabilities, train operation speed, and unit costs of the safety counter-mea-
sures (track strengthening, early warning systems, and braking systems) in Case Study I.
All the sensitivity analyses performed here use real risk measure (i.e., c= 1.0).
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1 For earthquake probabilities:
(1) Po=0.01
TL Cost Cs 1  Cb2  Cw3  Option B/C Risk Reduc.
($K) Ratio ($K)
10 0.0" 0.0 10.0 2 17.9 179
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 17.2 344
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 14.3 428
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 11.3 453
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 10.0 500
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 9.1 549
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 8.4 588
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 7.8 621
90 64.0 13.5 12.5 7 7.2 649
100 72.0 15.5 12.5 7 6.8 676
210 182 15.5 12.5 7 4.0 842
220 192 15.5 12.5 7 3.9 852
Table B.1: Optimal investment allocation (Po =0.01)
1. Budget allocated to track strengthening,
2. Budget allocated to installing advanced braking systems,
3. Budget allocated to setting up early warning systems.
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(2) Po=0.015
TL Cost B/C Risk
($K) Ratio Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 1020 2 264 264
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 25.3 506
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 20.9 628
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 16.6 664
50 34.5 15.5 0.0 5 14.4 721
60 44.2 15.5 0.0 5 13.2 791
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 12.1 847
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 11.2 893
90 64.0 13.5 12.5 7 10.4 935
100 72.0 15.5 12.5 7 9.7 973
260 232.0 15.5 12.5 7 4.9 1269
270 242.0 15.5 12.5 7 4.7 1279
Table B.2: Optimal investment allocation (P0 =0.015)
(3) Po=0.02
TL Cost B/C Risk
($K) Cs Cb Cw Option Ratio Reduc.($K)
10 T00 0.0 .0 2 34.5 345
20 0.0 10.6 9.4 6 33.4 668
30 0.0 15.3 14.7 6 27.3 819
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 21.6 866
50 34.5 15.5 0.0 5 18.5 926
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 16.9 1015
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 15.5 1086
80 54.0 13.5 12.5 7 14.3 1144
90 62.0 15.5 12.5 7 13.3 1199
100 72.0 15.5 12.5 7 12.5 1247
290 262.0 15.5 12.5 7 5.7 1654
300 272.0 15.5 12.5 7 5.6 1665
Table B.3: Optimal investment allocation (Po =0.02)
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(2. For train operating speed:
(1) Vo=40(km/hour)
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Redu.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 --2 -4.8 48.4
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 4.9 97.4
30 0.0 12.2 17.8 6 4.6 136
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 3.7 146
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 3.4 170
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 3.1 187
70 54.5 15.5 0.0 5 2.9 201
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 2.7 213
90 72.2 17.8 0.0 5 2.5 223
100 82.2 17.8 0.0 5 2.3 232
Table B.4: Optimal investment allocation (Vo=40)
(2) V0=60(km/hour)
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Redue.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 . 10.0 2 15.1 151
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 14.0 279
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 10.7 321
40 0.0 20.5 19.5 6 8.4 336
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 7.4 370
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 6.8 406
70 45.6 11.9 12.5 7 6.2 436
80 54.0 13.5 12.5 7 5.8 462
90 64.0 13.5 12.5 7 5.4 483
100 74.0 13.5 12.5 7 5.0 502
.... o ....
150 122.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.8 569
160 132.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.6 579
Table B.5: Optimal investment allocation (Vo=60)
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(3) Vo=70(km/hour)
TL Cost RiskTL Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 23.3 233
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 20.5 410
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 14.8 444
40 0.0 20.5 19.5 6 11.5 461
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 10.0 499
60 35.6 11.9 12.5 7 9.2 551
70 45.6 11.9 12.5 7 8.5 594
80 55.6 11.9 12.5 7 7.8 627
90 64.0 13.5 12.5 7 7.3 656
100 74.0 13.5 12.5 7 6.8 681
190 165.6 11.9 12.5 7 4.3 816
200 174.0 13.5 12.5 7 4.1 826
Table B.6: Optimal investment allocation (Vo=70)
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3. For cost functions:
Before doing the numerical sensitivity analyses, we represent the cost functions in the fol-
lowing way for clarity:
(1) Cost functions for track strengthening:
Equation 5.1 --->T_m
Equation 5.2 --->T_h
Equation 5.3 --->T_1
(1) Cost functions for track strengthening:
Equation 5.4 --->W_m
Equation 5.5 --->W_h
Equation 5.6 --->W_I
(1) Cost functions for track strengthening:
Equation 5.7 --->B_m
Equation 5.8 --->B_h
Equation 5.9 --->B_1
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(1) Th+W_h+B_h
TL Cost RiskTL ost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 ......
20 0.0 0.0 20 2 6.7 134
30 0.0 0.0 30 2 5.9 176
40 0.0 18.7 21.3 6 5.1 203
50 0.0 21.2 28.8 6 4.4 218
60 41.2 0.0 18.8 4 3.8 230
70 48.9 21.2 0.0 5 3.6 250
80 55.9 24.1 0.0 5 3.4 269
90 65.9 24.1 0.0 5 3.2 285
100 75.9 24.1 0.0 5 3.0 300
120 92.4 27.6 0.0 5 2.7 324
130 102.4 27.6 0.0 5 2.6 334
Table B.7: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_h+B_h)
(2) T_h+W_h+B_m
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0 10 0 3 7.6 76
20 0 0 20 2 6.7 134
30 0 13.5 16.5 6 6.8 204
40 0 20.5 19.5 6 5.6 224
50 0 27 23 6 4.7 233
60 36.8 23.2 0 5 4.1 246
70 46.8 23.2 0 5 3.8 268
80 59.5 20.5 0 5 3.6 285
90 69.5 20.5 0 5 3.3 300
100 76.6 23.4 0 5 3.1 313
110 86.6 23.4 0 5 3.0 325
120 96.6 23.4 0 5 2.8 335
Table B.8: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_h+B_m)
109
(3) Th+W_h+B_l
TL Cost RiskTL Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0 10 0 3 12.5 125
20 0 7.1 12.9 6 9.3 187
30 0 15.7 14.3 6 7.6 227
40 0 17.8 22.2 6 5.9 236
50 37.9 12.1 0 5 4.9 246
60 46.2 13.8 0 5 4.5 270
70 54.3 15.7 0 5 4.1 288
80 62.2 17.8 0 5 3.8 304
90 72.2 17.8 0 5 3.5 318
100 82.2 17.8 0 5 3.3 329
110 92.2 17.8 0 5 3.1 339
Table B.9: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_h+B_I)
(4) T_h+W_m+B_h
TL Cost RiskL($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0 0 10 2 9.1 91
20 0 0 20 2 8.8 176
30 0 13.2 16.8 6 6.6 199
40 0 21.2 18.9 6 5.5 221
50 0 27.6 22.4 6 4.6 231
60 44 0 16 4 4.1 243
70 54 0 16 4 3.7 260
80 64 0 16 4 3.4 275
90 58.8 18.7 12.5 7 3.2 290
100 65.3 18.7 16 7 3.1 305
120 85.3 18.7 16 7 2.7 330
130 82.5 21.5 16 7 2.6 340
Table B.10: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_m+B_h)
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(5) T_h+Wm+B m
TL Cost Risk
o($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 9.1 91
20 0.0 0 20.0 2 8.8 176
30 0.0 15.5 14.5 6 7.3 219
40 0.0 23.6 16.4 6 5.8 231
50 0.0 30.8 19.2 6 4.7 236
60 42.2 17.8 0.0 5 4.1 246
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.8 268
80 66.5 13.5 0.0 5 3.6 286
90 62.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.4 302
100 72.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.2 316
110 82.0 15.5 12.5 7 3.0 327
120 89.7 17.8 12.5 7 3.2 337
Table B.11: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_m+B_m)
(6) T_h+W_m+B_I
TL Cost Risk
o($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 10.0 0.0 3 12.5 125
20 0.0 9.2 10.8 6 10.7 214
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.8 234
40 0.0 17.8 22.2 6 5.9 237
50 37.9 12.1 0.0 5 4.9 246
60 46.2 13.8 0.0 5 4.5 270
70 54.3 15.7 0.0 5 4.1 288
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.8 304
90 72.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.5 318
100 82.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.3 329
110 92.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.1 339
Table B.12: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_m+Bj)
(7) Th+W 1+B_h
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 . .0 10.0 2 17.6 176
20 0.0 14.7 5.3 6 8.6 172
30 0.0 18.7 11.3 6 7.4 221
40 0.0 27.6 12.4 6 5.8 232
50 39.7 0.0 10.3 4 4.8 242
60 47.0 0.0 13.0 4 4.3 260
70 57.0 0.0 13.0 4 3.9 275
80 67.0 0.0 13.0 4 3.6 288
90 77.0 0.0 13.0 4 3.3 299
100 87.0 0.0 13.0 4 3.1 309
Table B.13: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_1+Bh)
(8) T_h+W_1+B_1
TL Cost RiskCs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 17.6 176
20 0.0 12.1 7.7 6 11.5 231
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.9 238
40 32.0 0.0 8.0 4 5.4 214
50 35.7 8.0 6.3 7 5.0 250
60 42.8 9.2 8.0 7 4.6 275
70 52.8 9.2 8.0 7 4.2 294
80 61.4 10.6 8.0 7 3.7 310
90 71.4 10.6 8.0 7 3.6 323
100 81.4 10.6 8.0 7 3.3 334
110 91.4 10.6 8.0 7 3.1 344
Table B.14: Optimal investment allocation (T_h+W_I+B_I)
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(9) T_h+W_1+B_m
TL Cost RiskTL Cost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 217.6 176
20 0.0 11.9 8.1 6 10.6 213
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.7 232
40 0.0 27.0 13.0 6 5.9 237
50 0.0 39.8 10.2 4 4.8 241
60 0.0 47.0 13.0 4 4.3 260
70 47.9 11.9 10.2 7 4.0 281
80 57.9 11.9 10.2 7 3.7 298
90 66.3 13.5 10.2 7 3.5 311
100 76.3 13.5 10.2 7 3.3 325
110 86.3 13.5 10.2 7 3.1 336
120 96.3 13.5 10.2 7 2.9 346
Table B.15: Optimal investment allocation (Th+W_1+B_m)
(10) T_m+W_h+B_h
TL Cost RiskL($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 __..
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 6.7 134
30 0.0 0.0 30.0 2 5.9 176
40 0.0 15.5 24.5 6 5.6 169
50 31.3 18.7 0.0 5 4.7 237
60 41.3 18.7 0.0 5 4.5 267
70 48.8 21.2 0.0 5 4.1 290
80 58.8 21.2 0.0 5 3.9 310
90 68.8 21.2 0.0 5 3.6 326
100 78.8 21.2 0.0 5 3.4 340
130 105.9 24.1 0.0 2.9 375
140 115.9 24.1 0.0 2.7 385
Table B.16: Optimal investment allocation (Tm+W_h+B_h)
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(11) T_m+W_h+B_m
TL Cost RiskTL Cost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Risk
($K) Reduc.($K)
20 0.0 20.0 0.0 3 6.6 134
30 0.0 13.5 16.5 6 6.8 203
40 0.0 20.5 19.5 6 5.6 224
50 36.5 13.5 0.0 5 5.2 260
60 44.5 15.5 0.0 5 4.8 286
70 52.2 17.8 0.0 5 4.4 306
80 62.2 17.8 0.0 5 4.0 324
90 72.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.8 338
100 82.2 17.8 0.0 5 3.5 352
120 99.5 20.5 0.0 5 3.1 374
130 109.5 20.5 0.0 5 3.0 384
Table B.17: Optimal investment allocation (T_m+W_h+B_m)
(12) T_m+W_h+B_1
TL Cost RiskCs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Redue.($K)
S 1 0.0 10.0 0.0 3 12.5 125
20 0.0 7.1 12.9 6 9.3 187
30 0.0 15.7 14.3 6 7.6 227
40 29.4 10.6 0.0 5 6.3 254
50 27.9 12.1 0.0 5 5.7 283
60 46.2 13.8 0.0 5 5.1 306
70 56.2 13.8 0.0 5 4.6 325
80 64.3 15.7 0.0 5 4.3 340
90 74.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.9 354
100 84.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.7 366
1 10 94.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.4 376
Table B.18: Optimal investment allocation (T_m+W_h+BI)
(13) Tm+W_m+B_h
TL Cost RiskTL ost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 9.1 91
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 8.8 176
30 0.0 16.8 13.2 6 6.6 199
40 0.0 21.2 18.8 6 5.5 221
50 37.5 0.0 12.5 4 5.1 254
60 47.5 0.0 12.5 4 4.6 275
70 54.0 0.0 16.0 4 4.2 292
80 50.7 16.8 12.5 7 3.9 310
90 58.8 18.7 12.5 7 3.6 327
100 68.8 18.7 12.5 7 3.4 242
120 88.8 18.7 12.5 7 3.1 376
130 98.8 18.7 12.5 7 2.9 377
Table B.19: Optimal investment allocation (Tm+W_m+B_h)
(14) T_m+W_m+B_1
TL Cost Risk($K)s Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 10.0 0.0 3 12.5 125
20 0.0 9.2 10.8 6 10.7 214
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.8 234
40 29.4 10.6 0.0 5 6.3 254
50 37.9 12.1 0.0 5 5.7 283
60 46.2 13.8 0.0 5 5.1 306
70 56.2 13.8 0.0 5 4.6 325
80 64.3 15.7 0.0 5 4.3 340
90 74.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.9 354
100 84.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.7 366
110 94.3 15.7 0.0 5 3.4 377
Table B.20: Optimal investment allocation (Tm+W_m+B_I)
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(15) T_m+W_1+B_h
TL Cost RiskTL Cost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Risk
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0T. 10.0 2 17.6W' T76
20 0.0 14.7 5.3 6 8.6 172
30 0.0 18.7 11.3 6 7.4 221
40 32.0 0.0 8.0 4 6.2 247
50 39.7 0.0 10.3 4 5.4 271
60 49.7 0.0 10.3 4 4.8 290
70 59.7 0.0 10.3 4 4.4 306
80 52.9 16.8 10.3 7 4.0 324
90 62.9 16.8 10.3 7 3.8 339
100 72.9 16.8 10.3 7 3.5 353
120 92.9 16.8 10.3 7 3.1 376
130 102.9 16.8 10.3 7 3.0 386
Table B.21: Optimal investment allocation (T_m+W_l+B_h)
(16) T_m+W_1+B_m
TL Cost RiskTL Cost Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Risk
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 17.6 176
20 0.0 11.9 8.1 6 10.6 213
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.7 232
40 32.0 0.0 8.0 4 6.2 247
50 39.7 0.0 10.3 4 5.4 271
60 40.1 11.9 8.0 7 4.9 296
70 50.1 11.9 8.0 7 4.5 317
80 57.8 11.9 10.3 7 4.2 334
90 67.8 11.9 10.3 7 3.9 349
100 77.8 11.9 10.3 7 3.6 362
110 87.8 11.9 10.3 7 3.4 373
120 97.8 11.9 10.3 7 3.2 383
Table B.22: Optimal investment allocation (T_m+W_1+B_m)
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(17) T_m+W_I+B_1
TL Cost RiskTL t Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 17.6 176
20 0.0 12.1 7.9 6 11.5 231
30 0.0 17.8 12.2 6 7.9 238
40 26.6 7.1 6.3 7 6.4 254
50 35.7 8.0 6.3 7 5.7 287
60 44.0 8.0 8.0 7 5.2 311
70 52.8 9.2 8.0 7 4.7 329
80 62.8 9.2 8.0 7 4.3 344
90 72.8 9.2 8.0 7 4.0 358
100 82.8 9.2 8.0 7 3.7 370
110 92.8 9.2 8.0 7 3.5 380
Table B.23: Optimal investment allocation (T_m+W_I+B_I)
(18)T_I+W_h+B_h
TL Cost RiskCs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 .. - " - - ---
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 6.7 134
30 14.5 15.5 0.0 5 6.8 205
40 24.5 15.5 0.0 5 6.7 270
50 33.2 16.8 0.0 5 6.2 310
60 43.2 16.8 0.0 5 5.7 340
70 53.2 16.8 0.0 5 5.2 364
80 63.2 16.8 0.0 5 4.8 385
90 73.2 16.8 0.0 5 4.5 401
100 83.2 16.8 0.0 5 4.2 416
120 103.2 16.8 0.0 5 3.7 441....
120 103.2 16.8 0.0 5 3.7 441
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Table B.24: Optimal investment allocation (TI+Wh+Bh)
(19) T_1+W_h+B_m
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 10.0 0.0 3 7.6 76
20 10.8 9.2 0.0 5 7.1 143
30 19.4 10.6 0.0 5 8.3 249
40 28.1 11.9 0.0 5 7.4 297
50 38.1 11.9 0.0 5 6.6 330
60 48.1 11.9 0.0 5 5.9 357
70 56.5 13.5 0.0 5 5.4 378
80 66.5 13.5 0.0 5 5.0 396
90 76.5 13.5 0.0 5 4.6 411
100 86.5 13.5 0.0 5 4.2 424
. ......
120 108.1 11.9 0.0 5 3.7 448
130 109.1 11.9 0.0 5 3.5 458
Table B.25: Optimal investment allocation (T_+W_h+Bm)
(20) T_1+W_h+B_I
TL Cost RiskCs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0 10 0 3 1215 123
20 13.8 6.2 0 5 10.6 212
30 22 8.0 0 5 9.3 280
40 30.8 9.2 0 5 8.0 320
50 40.8 9.2 0 5 7.0 350
60 49.4 10.6 0 5 6.2 373
70 59.4 10.6 0 5 5.6 391
80 69.4 10.6 0 5 5.1 408
90 79.4 10.6 0 5 4.7 421
100 89.4 10.6 0 5 4.3 434
1.10' , 99.4 10.6 0 5 4.0 444
Table B.26: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_h+BI)
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(21) TI+W_m+B_h
Risk
TL Cost iL($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K($K))
10 0.0 0.0 10.0 2 9.1 91
20 0.0 0.0 20.0 2 8.8 176
30 20.0 0.0 10.0 4 8.1 242
40 30.0 0.0 10.0 4 7.1 283
50 40.0 0.0 10.0 4 6.2 312
60 50.0 0.0 10.0 4 5.6 334
70 43.2 16.8 10.0 7 5.1 355
80 53.2 16.8 10.0 7 4.7 377
90 63.2 16.8 10.0 7 4.4 395
100 73.2 16.8 10.0 7 4.1 411
130 103.2 16.8 10.0 7 3.4 447
140 113.2 16.8 10.0 7 3.3 456
Table B.27: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_m+Bh)
(22) T_1+Wm+B_m
Risk
TL CostL($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K($K)
10 0 0 10 2 9.1 91
20 0 0 20 2 8.8 176
30 19.4 10.6 0 5 8.3 249
40 28.1 11.9 0 5 7.4 297
50 38.1 11.9 0 5 6.6 330
60 48.1 11.9 0 5 5.9 357
70 56.5 13.5 0 5 5.4 378
80 66.5 13.5 0 5 5.0 396
90 76.5 13.5 0 5 4.6 411
100 86.5 13.5 0 5 4.2 424
110 86.5 13.5 0 5 4.2 437
120 86.5 13.5 0 5 4.2 448
Table B.28: Optimal investment allocation (T_1+Wm+B_m)
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(23) T_I+W_m+B_I
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio
($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 10.0 0.0 3 12.5 125
20 0.0 9.2 10.8 6 10.7 214
30 23.8 6.2 0.0 5 9.3 280
40 31.6 8.4 0.0 5 8.0 320
50 40.8 9.2 0.0 5 7.0 350
60 49.4 10.6 0.0 5 6.2 373
70 59.4 10.6 0.0 5 5.6 392
80 69.4 10.6 0.0 5 5.1 408
90 79.4 10.6 0.0 5 4.7 421
100 89.4 10.6 0.0 5 4.3 434
110 99.4 10.6 0.0 5 4.0 445
120' 100.8 9.2 0.0 5 3.8 455,
Table B.29: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_m+B_1)
(24) T_1+W_1+B_h
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)($K) Redue.($K)
10 0.0 10.0 0.0 2 17.6 176
20 15.0 0.0 5.0 4 10.5 210
30 25.0 0.0 5.0 4 8.9 267
40 35.0 0.0 5.0 4 7.5 301
50 45.0 0.0 5.0 4 6.5 327
60 36.5 15.5 8.0 4 5.8 348
70 46.5 15.5 8.0 7 5.3 370
80 56.5 15.5 8.0 7 4.9 389
90 66.5 15.5 8.0 7 4.5 406
100 76.5 15.5 8.0 7 4.2 419
120 96.5 15.5 8.0 7 3.7 443
130 106.5 15.5 8.0 7 3.5 453
Table B.30: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_I+B_h)
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(25) T_I+W_1+B_m
TL Cost RiskTL Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc.($K)
($K) Reduc.($K)
1N0 0.0 .0.0 10.0 2 17.6 "176
20 0.0 11.9 8.1 6 10.6 213
30 25.0 0.0 5.0 4 8.9 267
40 35.0 0.0 5.0 4 7.5 301
50 33.2 10.6 6.2 7 6.7 333
60 40.1 11.9 8.0 7 6.0 361
70 51.4 10.6 8.0 7 5.5 385
80 61.4 10.6 8.0 7 5.0 400
90 71.4 10.6 8.0 7 4.6 414
100 81.4 10.6 8.0 7 4.3 427
110 91.4 10.6 8.0 7 4.0 439
120 101.4 10.6 8.0 7 3.7 449
Table B.31: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_I+B_m)
(26) T_I+W_1+B_1
TL Cost Risk($K) Cs Cb Cw Option B/C Ratio Reduc($K)($K) Reduc.($K)
10 0.0 0- 0 .. 10.0 2 17.6 176
20 0.0 12.1 7.9 6 11.5 231
30 0.0 8.0 22.0 6 9.3 280
40 0.0 9.2 30.8 6 8.0 320
50 36.3 7.1 6.2 7 7.0 350
60 45.8 8.0 6.2 7 6.2 374
70 55.8 8.0 6.2 7 5.6 393
80 65.8 8.0 6.2 7 5.1 408
90 75.8 8.0 6.2 7 4.7 422
100 85.8 8.0 6.2 7 4.3 434
110 95.8 8.0 6.2 7 4.0 445
120 105.8 8.0 6.2 7 3.8 455
Table B.32: Optimal investment allocation (T_I+W_I+B_I)
